Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization by Echenique, Federico et al.
Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization
Federico Echenique Taisuke Imai Kota Saito
∗
This draft: February 15, 2021
First draft: June 22, 2018
Abstract
We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility theory. For any positive
number 𝑒 , we give a characterization of the datasets with a rationalization that is within 𝑒 (in
beliefs, utility, or perceived prices) of expected utility theory. The number 𝑒 can then be used
as a measure of how far the data is to expected utility theory. We apply our methodology
to data from three large-scale experiments. Many subjects in those experiments are consis-
tent with utility maximization, but not with expected utility maximization. Our measure of
distance to expected utility is correlated with subjects’ demographic characteristics.
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Revealed preference theory has traditionally, through its 80-year history, dealt with the empirical
content of general utility maximization. Recent research has, in contrast, turned to the empiri-
cal content of specic utility theories. Mostly the focus has been on expected utility (EU): recent
theoretical work seeks to characterize the observable choice behaviors that are consistent with ex-
pected utility maximization. At the same time, a number of recent empirical revealed-preference
studies use data on choices under risk and uncertainty, in which participants make a series of
choices from budget sets. We seek to bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of
expected utility theory, and the machinery needed to analyze experimental data on choices under
risk and uncertainty.
Imagine an agent making economic decisions, choosing contingent consumption given mar-
ket prices and income. Revealed preference theory studies the consistency of such choices with
utility maximization. Consistency, however, is a black or white question. The choices are either
consistent with EU or they are not. Our contribution is to provide a way to describe the de-
gree to which choices are consistent with EU. We propose a measure of the degree of a dataset’s
consistency with EU.
Revealed preference theory has developed measures of consistency with general utility maxi-
mization. The most widely used measure is the Critical Cost E ciency Index (CCEI) proposed by
Afriat (1972). The basic idea in the CCEI is to ctitiously decrease an agent’s budget so that fewer
options are revealed preferred to a given choice. The CCEI has been widely used to analyze ex-
perimental data on choices from budget sets. See, for example, Choi et al. (2007), Ahn et al. (2014),
Choi et al. (2014), Carvalho et al. (2016), Carvalho and Silverman (2019), and Halevy et al. (2018).
All of these experimental studies involve subjects making decisions under risk or uncertainty,
and CCEI was proposed as a measure of consistency with general utility maximization, not EU,
the most commonly-used theory to explain choices under risk or uncertainty.
Of course, there is nothingwrongwith studying general utilitymaximization in environments
with risk and uncertainty, but the data is ideally suited to studying theories of choice under
risk and uncertainty, and it should be of great interest to evaluate EU using this data. We shall
argue (on both theoretical and empirical grounds) that our method provides a more accurate and
intuitive measure of consistency with EU than using CCEI.
Our main contribution is to propose a measure of how far a dataset is from being consistent
with EU. The measure is di erent from CCEI: we explain theoretically why our measure, and not
CCEI, best captures the distance of a dataset to EU theory. We also argue on empirical grounds
that our measure passes “smell tests” that CCEI fails. For example, CCEI ignores the manifest
violations of EU where subjects make rst-order stochastically dominated choices. And CCEI
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does not correlate well with the property of downward-sloping demand, a property that is implied
by EUmaximization.
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We also provide a revealed preference axiomatization of the measure based
on observed prices and consumption.
In the sequel, we rst lay out the implications of EU that cannot be captured by CCEI, and
give an overview of our approach. After a theoretical discussion of our measure of consistency
(with objective EU discussed in Section 3 and subjective EU in Section 5), we present an empirical
application using data from experiments on choices under risk (Section 4).
Our empirical application has two purposes. The rst is to illustrate how our method can be
applied and to argue that our measure of distance to EU is useful and sensible. The second is to
o er new insights into existing data. We use data from three large-scale experiments (Choi et al.,
2014; Carvalho et al., 2016; Carvalho and Silverman, 2019), each with over 1,000 subjects, that
involve choices under risk. Consistency with general utility maximization is well understood in
these studies using CCEI. We test for EU theory using our methodology.
There are two main take-away messages from our empirical application. First, the data shows
that there is a gap between consistency with general utility maximization (measured with CCEI)
and EU maximization (quanti ed with our measure). Subjects with CCEI close to one, who are
largely consistent with utility maximization, exhibit diverse degrees of consistency with EU. Our
measure detects violations of a basic property of EU that we term downward-sloping demand,
and violations of monotonicity with respect to rst-order stochastic dominance. CCEI, on the
other hand, is less sensitive to these features in choice data. Second, the correlation between
closeness to EU and demographic characteristics yields intuitive results. We nd that younger
subjects, those who have high cognitive abilities, and those who are working, are closer to EU
behavior than older, low cognitive ability, or non-working, subjects. For some of the three experi-
ments, we also nd that highly educated, high-income, and male subjects, are closer to EU. These
observations suggest that our measure complements CCEI as an empirical toolkit and provides
additional insights on datasets that had been analyzed primarily with CCEI.
1.1 How to Measure Deviations from EU
The CCEI is meant to test deviations from general utility maximization. If an agent’s behavior
is not consistent with utility maximization, then it cannot possibly be consistent with EU maxi-
mization. Thus it stands to reason that if an agent’s behavior is far from being rationalizable as
measured by CCEI, then it is also far from being rationalizable with an EU function. The problem
is, of course, that an agent’s behavior may be rationalizable with a general utility function but
not with EU.
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choice pattern consistent with EU.
Broadly speaking, the CCEI proceeds by “amending” inconsistent choices through the device
of changing income. This works for general utility maximization, but it is the wrong way to
amend choices that are inconsistent with EU. Since EU is about getting marginal rates of substi-
tution right, prices, not incomes, need to be changed. The problem is illustrated with a simple
example in Figure 1.
Suppose that there are two states of the world, labeled 1 and 2. An agent purchases a state-
contingent asset 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2), given Arrow-Debreu prices 𝑝 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2) and her income. Prices
and income dene a budget set. In Figure 1A, we are given two choices for the agent, 𝑥𝑎 and 𝑥𝑏 ,
for two di erent budgets. The choices in Figure 1A are inconsistent with utility maximization:
they violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP). When 𝑥𝑏 (𝑥𝑎) was chosen, 𝑥𝑎 (𝑥𝑏 ,
respectively) was strictly inside of the budget set. This violation of WARP can be resolved by
shifting down the budget line associated with choice 𝑥𝑏 to the dashed green line passing through
𝑥𝑎 . Alternatively, the violation can be resolved by shifting down the budget line associated with
choice 𝑥𝑎 to the dashed blue line passing through 𝑥𝑏 . CCEI is the smallest of the two shifts that
are needed: the smallest proportion of shifting down a budget line to resolve WARP violation.
Therefore, the CCEI of this dataset is given by the dashed green line passing through 𝑥𝑎 . That is,
the CCEI is (𝑝𝑏 · 𝑥𝑎)/(𝑝𝑏 · 𝑥𝑏).
Now consider the example in Figure 1B. There are again two choices, 𝑥𝑎 and 𝑥𝑏 , for two
di erent budgets. These choices do not violate WARP, and comply with the theory of utility
maximization with CCEI = 1. The choices in the panel are not, however, compatible with EU.
To see why, assume that the dataset were rationalized by an expected utility: `1𝑢 (𝑥𝑘1 ) + `2𝑢 (𝑥𝑘2 ),
where (`1, `2) are the probabilities of the two states, and 𝑢 is a (smooth) concave utility function
over money. Note that the slope of a tangent line to the indi erence curve at a point 𝑥𝑘 is equal
to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS): `1𝑢
′(𝑥𝑘
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) = `1/`2. This is a contradiction
because in Figure 1B, the two tangent lines (green dashed lines) associated with 𝑥𝑎 and 𝑥𝑏 cross
each other. Figure 1C shows an example of choices that are consistent with EU. Note that tangent
lines at the 45-degree line are parallel in this case.
Importantly, the violation in Figure 1B cannot be resolved by shifting budget lines up or down,
or more generally by adjusting agents’ expenditures. The reason is that the empirical content of
expected utility is captured by the relation between prices and marginal rates of substitution. The
slope, not the level, of the budget line, is what matters. The basic insight comes from the equality















Since marginal utility is decreasing, equation (1) imposes a negative relation between prices and
quantities. The distance to EU is directly related to how far the data is to complying with such
a negative relation between prices and quantities. The formal connection is established in The-
orem 2. Empirically, as we shall see, the degree of compliance of a subject’s choices with this
“downward sloping demand” property, goes a long way to capturing the degree of compliance of
the subject’s choices with EU.
We propose a measure of how close the data is to being consistent with EU maximization.
Our measure is based on the idea that marginal rates of substitution have to conform to EU
maximization: whether data conform to equation (1). If one “perturbs” marginal utility enough,
then a dataset is always consistent with expected utility. Our measure is simply a measure of
how large of a perturbation is needed to rationalize the data. Perturbations of marginal utility
can be interpreted in three dierent, but equivalent, ways: as measurement error on prices, as
random shocks to marginal utility in the fashion of random utility theory (McFadden, 1974), or
as perturbations to agents’ beliefs. For example, if the data in Figure 1B is “𝑒 away” from being
consistent with expected utility given a positive number 𝑒 , then one can nd beliefs `𝑎 and `𝑏 ,
one for each observation so that EU is maximized for these observation-speci c beliefs, and the
degree of perturbation of beliefs is bounded by 𝑒 .
Ourmeasure can be applied in settings where probabilities are known and objective, for which
we develop a theory in Section 3, and an application to experimental data in Section 4. It can also
be applied to settings where probabilities are not known, and therefore subjective (Section 5).
Finally, we propose a statistical methodology for testing the null hypothesis of consistency
with EU (Section 4.3). Our test relies on a set of auxiliary assumptions. The test indicatesmoderate
levels of rejection of the EU hypothesis.
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1.2 Related Literature
Revealed preference theory has developed tests for consistencywith general utilitymaximization.
The seminal papers include Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), and Varian (1982). See Chambers and
Echenique (2016) for an exposition of the basic theory.
More recent work has explored the testable implications of EU theory. This work includes
Green and Srivastava (1986), Chambers et al. (2016), Kübler et al. (2014), Echenique and Saito
(2015), and Polisson et al. (2020). The rst four papers focus, as we do here, on rationalizability
for risk-averse agents. Green and Srivastava (1986) and Chambers et al. (2016) allow for many
goods in each state, which our methodology cannot accommodate. Polisson et al. (2020) present a
general approach to testing that allows for a test of EU in isolation, not jointly with risk aversion.
Our assumptions are the same as in Kübler et al. (2014) and Echenique and Saito (2015).
Compared to most of the existing revealed preference literature on EU, our focus is on mea-
suring consistency with EU, not on providing a test. Our assumption of monetary payo s and
risk aversion is restrictive but consistent with how EU theory is used in economics. Many eco-
nomic models assume EU together with risk aversion. Our results speak directly to the empirical
relevance of such models. A further motivation for focusing on risk aversion is empirical: in the
data we have looked at, corner choices are very rare. This would rule out risk-seeking behav-
ior in the context of EU. Thus, arguably, EU and risk-loving behavior would not be a candidate
explanation of the experimental data we examine in this paper.
Asmentioned, the CCEI was proposed by Afriat (1972). Varian (1990) proposes amodi cation,
and Echenique et al. (2011) and Dean andMartin (2016) propose alternative measures. Dziewulski
(2020) provides a foundation for CCEI based on the model in Dziewulski (2016), which seeks to
rationalize violations of utility-maximizing behavior with a model of just-noticeable di erences.
Compared to the literature based on the CCEI, we present an explicit model of the errors that
would explain the deviation from EU. As a consequence, our measure of consistency with EU is
based on a “story” for why choices are inconsistent with EU. And, as we have explained above,
the nature of EU-consistent choices is poorly re ected in the CCEI’s budget adjustments.
Apesteguia and Ballester (2015) propose a general method to measure the distance between
theory and data in revealed preference settings. For each possible preference relation, they cal-
culate the swaps index, which counts the number of alternatives that must be swapped with the
chosen alternative in order for the preference relation to rationalize the data. Then, Apesteguia
and Ballester (2015) consider the preference relation that minimizes the total number of swaps in
all the observations, weighted by their relative occurrence in the data. Apesteguia and Ballester
(2015) assume that there is a nite number of alternatives, and thus a nite number of preference
relations over the set of alternatives. Because of the niteness, they can calculate the swaps index
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for each preference relation and nd the preference relation that minimizes the swaps index. This
method by Apesteguia and Ballester (2015) is not directly applicable to our setup because in our
setup, a set of alternatives is a budget set and contains in nitely many elements; moreover, the
number of expected utility preferences relation is in nite.
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There are many other studies of revealed preference that are based on a notion of distance
between the theory and the data. For example, Halevy et al. (2018) uses such distances as a guide
in estimating parametric functional forms for the utility function.
Polisson et al. (2020) develop a general method called the Generalized Restriction of In nite
Domain (GRID) for testing consistency with models of choice under risk and uncertainty. Using
GRID, they provide a way to calculate CCEI for departures from EU. Importantly, and in contrast
with our measure, their approach does not rely on risk aversion. They present measures of de-
parture from EU and risk-averse EU. We compare empirically our measure to theirs in Section 4.2
(the Online Appendix has additional details). Su ce it to say here that the measures are similar,
but distinct, when applied to the data, and that the di erences cannot be attributed to risk aver-
sion. Theoretically, our approach has the advantage of modeling a speci c source of deviations
from EU, and our results connect the measure to certain observable behavioral patterns. These
include exact behavioral patterns described by the theorems, but also an empirically motivated
observation that our measure captures compliance with downward-sloping demand.
Finally, de Clippel and Rozen (2020) measure consistency with utility maximization by way of
departures from rst-order conditions, an approach similar to ours. Their FOC-Departure Index
(FDI) can be computed for di erent classes of utility functions. In particular, their FDI measure
for risk-averse expected utility is equivalent to our measure, except for the use of di erent scaling
(their measure Y ∈ [0, 1] is the same as a transformation of our measure 𝑒 ≥ 0, with Y = 𝑒/(1+𝑒)).
Their axiomatization is di erent from ours in that their primitives are weak orderings on pairs
of price and utility gradient (derivatives of utility function).
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On the other hand, we provide an
axiomatization based on the observed prices and chosen allocations. The result in their Proposi-
tion 8 is perhaps closest in spirit to our exercise, where they show that computing the measure
reduces to checking a set of inequalities. See Remarks C.1 and C.2 in Online Appendix C of our
paper. De Clippel and Rozen’s work is independent and contemporaneous to ours.
2
In Appendix D.1 of Apesteguia and Ballester (2015), they consider the swaps index for expected utility prefer-
ences while assuming the niteness of the set of alternatives. In their Appendix D.3, without axiomatization, they
consider the swaps index for an in nite set of alternatives using the Lebesgue measure to “count” the number of
swaps. However, they do not study the case where the number of alternatives is in nite and the preference relations
are expected utility.
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Let 𝑆 be a nite set of states. We occasionally use 𝑆 to denote the number |𝑆 | of states. Let
Δ++(𝑆) = {` ∈ R𝑆++ |
∑𝑆
𝑠=1 `𝑠 = 1} denote the set of strictly positive probability measures on 𝑆 .
In our model, the objects of choice are state-contingent monetary payo s, or monetary acts. A
monetary act is a vector in R𝑆+.
De nition 1. A dataset is a nite collection of pairs (𝑥, 𝑝) ∈ R𝑆+ × R𝑆++.
The interpretation of a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is that it describes𝐾 purchases of a state-contingent
payo 𝑥𝑘 at some given vector of prices 𝑝𝑘 , and income 𝑝𝑘 · 𝑥𝑘 = ∑𝑠∈𝑆 𝑝𝑘𝑠 𝑥𝑘𝑠 . We sometimes use
𝐾 to denote the set {1, . . . , 𝐾}. For any prices 𝑝 ∈ R𝑆++ and positive number 𝐼 > 0, the set
𝐵(𝑝, 𝐼 ) = {𝑦 ∈ R𝑆+ | 𝑝 · 𝑦 ≤ 𝐼 } is the budget set de ned by 𝑝 and 𝐼 .






when faced with prices 𝑝 ∈ R𝑆++ and income 𝐼 > 0, where ` ∈ Δ++(𝑆) is a belief and𝑢 is a concave
utility function over money. We are interested in concave 𝑢; an assumption that corresponds to
risk aversion.
The belief ` will have two interpretations in our model. First, in Section 3, we shall focus on
decisions taken under risk. The belief ` will be a known “objective” probability measure `∗ ∈
Δ++(𝑆). Then, in Section 5, we study choice under uncertainty. Consequently, The belief ` will
be a subjective beliefs, which is unobservable to us as outside observers.
The following de nition formalizes the concept of as-if choices (Echenique and Saito, 2015).
De nition 2. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is Objective Expected Utility rational if there exists a concave
and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R such that, for all 𝑘 ,







where `∗ ∈ Δ++(𝑆) is an objective probability. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is Subjective Expected Utility
rational if there exist ` ∈ Δ++(𝑆) and a concave and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R such
that, for all 𝑘 ,







When imposed on a dataset, expected utility maximization (2) may be too demanding. We
are interested in situations where the model in (2) holds approximately. As a result, we shall
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relax (2) by “perturbing” some elements of the model. The exercise will be to see if a dataset is
consistent with the model in which some elements have been perturbed. Specically, we shall
perturb beliefs, utilities, or prices.
First, consider a perturbation of utility 𝑢. We allow 𝑢 to depend on the choice problem 𝑘 and
the realization of the state 𝑠 . We suppose that the utility of consumption 𝑥𝑠 in state 𝑠 is given
by Y𝑘𝑠 𝑢 (𝑥𝑠), with Y𝑘𝑠 being a (multiplicative) perturbation in utility. To sum up, given price 𝑝 and








when faced with prices 𝑝 ∈ R𝑆++ and income 𝐼 > 0. Here {Y𝑘𝑠 }𝑠∈𝑆,𝑘∈𝐾 is a set of perturbations, and
𝑢 is, as before, a concave utility function over money.
In the second place, consider a perturbation of beliefs. We allow ` to be di erent for each





`𝑘𝑠 𝑢 (𝑥𝑠), (3)
when faced with prices 𝑝 ∈ R𝑆++ and income 𝐼 > 0, where {`𝑘}𝑘∈𝐾 ⊂ Δ++(𝑆) is a set of beliefs and
𝑢 is a concave utility function over money.





with a perturbation Y𝑘𝑠 that depends on the choice problem 𝑘 and the state 𝑠 . Given price 𝑝 and










𝑠 for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 .
Observe that our three sources of perturbations have di erent interpretations, each can be
traced back to a long-standing tradition for how errors are introduced in economic models. Per-
turbed prices can be thought of a prices subject to measurement error, measurement error being
a very common source of perturbations in econometrics (Griliches, 1986). Perturbed utility is
an instance of random utility models (McFadden, 1974). Finally, perturbations of beliefs can be
thought of as a kind of random utility, or as an inability to exactly use probabilities. Note that we
perturb one source at a time and do not consider combinations of perturbations.
3 Perturbed Objective Expected Utility
In this section, we discuss choice under risk: there exists a known “objective” belief `∗ ∈ Δ++(𝑆)
that determines the realization of states. The experiments we discuss in Section 4 are all on choice
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under risk.
As mentioned above, we go through each of the sources of perturbation: beliefs, utility, and
prices. We seek to understand how large a perturbation has to be in order to rationalize a dataset.
It turns out that, for this purpose, all sources of perturbations are equivalent.
3.1 Belief Perturbation
Deviations from EU are accommodated by allowing a dierent belief at each observation. So we
assume a belief `𝑘 for each choice 𝑘 , and allow `𝑘 to di er from the objective `∗. We seek to





where 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 , di ers from 1. If the ratio is larger (smaller) than one, then it means that in choice
𝑘 , the decision maker believes the relative likelihood of state 𝑠 with respect to state 𝑡 is larger
(smaller, respectively) than what he should believe, given the objective belief `∗.
Given a non-negative number 𝑒 , we say that a dataset is 𝑒-belief-perturbed objective expected
utility (OEU) rational, if it can be rationalized using expected utility with perturbed beliefs for
which the relative likelihood ratios do not di er by more than 𝑒 from their objective equivalents.
Formally:
De nition 3. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rational if there exist
`𝑘 ∈ Δ++(𝑆) for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , and a concave and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R, such that,
for all 𝑘 ,
𝑦 ∈ 𝐵(𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 · 𝑥𝑘) =⇒
∑︁
𝑠∈𝑆
`𝑘𝑠 𝑢 (𝑦𝑠) ≤
∑︁
𝑠∈𝑆
`𝑘𝑠 𝑢 (𝑥𝑘𝑠 ),
and for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`∗𝑠 /`∗𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒. (4)
When 𝑒 = 0, 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rationality requires that `𝑘𝑠 = `
∗
𝑠 for all 𝑠 and 𝑘 , so
the case of exact consistency with expected utility is obtained with a zero bound of belief per-
turbations. Moreover, it is easy to see that by taking 𝑒 to be large enough, any dataset can be
𝑒-belief-perturbed rationalizable.
We should note that 𝑒 bounds belief perturbations for all states and observations. As such,
it can be sensitive to extreme observations and outliers (the CCEI is also subject to this critique:
see Echenique et al., 2011). In our empirical application, we carry out a robustness analysis to
account for such sensitivity (see Online Appendix F.3).
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Finally, we mention a potential relationship with models of nonexpected utility. One could
think of rank-dependent utility, for example, as a way of allowing agent’s beliefs to adapt to
his observed choices. However, unlike 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU, the nonexpected utility theory
requires some consistencies on the dependency. For example, for the case of rank-dependent
utility, the agent’s belief over the states is aected by the ranking of the outcomes across states.
3.2 Price Perturbation
We now turn to perturbed prices: think of them as prices measured with error. The perturbation
is a multiplicative noise term Y𝑘𝑠 to the Arrow-Debreu state price 𝑝
𝑘
𝑠 . Thus, perturbed state prices
are Y𝑘𝑠 𝑝
𝑘




𝑡 for all 𝑠, 𝑡 , then introducing the noise does not a ect anything
because it only changes the scale of prices. In other words, what matters is how perturbations
a ect relative prices, that is Y𝑘𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡 .





where 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 , di ers from 1.
De nition 4. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU rational if there exists a
concave and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R, and Y𝑘 ∈ R𝑆+ for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 such that, for all 𝑘 ,













and for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
Y𝑘𝑠
Y𝑘𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒. (5)
It is without loss of generality to add an additional restriction that 𝑝𝑘 · 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑝𝑘 · 𝑥𝑘 for each
𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 because what matters are the relative prices.
The idea is illustrated in Figure 2. The gure shows how the perturbations to relative prices
a ect budget lines, under the assumption that |𝑆 | = 2. For each value of 𝑒 ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 1} and
𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , the blue area represents the set{
𝑥 ∈ R𝑆+








































e =  1.00
C
Figure 2: Illustration of the set of possible perturbed budget sets with 𝑒 ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 1}. Notes: Panel C
presents an example of price-perturbed OEU rationalization. The solid blue line represents the perturbed
budget set and the green line represents the indierence curve.
of perturbed budget lines. The dataset in the gure is the same as in Figure 1B, which is not
rationalizable with any expected utility function as we discussed.
Figure 2C illustrates how we rationalize the dataset in Figure 1B. The blue bold lines are
perturbed budget lines and the green bold curves are ( xed) indi erence curves passing through
each of the 𝑥𝑘 in the data. The blue shaded areas are the sets of perturbed budget lines bounded
by 𝑒 = 1. Perturbed budget lines needed to rationalize the choices are indicated with blue bold
lines. Since they are inside the shaded areas, the dataset is price-perturbed OEU rational with
𝑒 = 1.
3.3 Utility Perturbation
Finally, we turn to perturbed utility. As explained above, perturbations are multiplicative and
take the form Y𝑘𝑠 𝑢 (𝑥𝑘𝑠 ). It is easy to see that this method is equivalent to belief perturbation.4 As
for price perturbations, we seek to measure how much the Y𝑘 perturbs utilities at choice problem




where 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 , di ers from 1.
De nition 5. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is 𝑒-utility-perturbed OEU rational if there exists a
4
We consider state-contingent perturbations. As such, perturbed utilities fall outside of the domain of EU theory.
We thank Jose Apesteguía and Miguel Ballester for pointing this out to us.
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concave and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R and Y𝑘 ∈ R𝑆+ for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 such that, for all 𝑘 ,










𝑠 𝑢 (𝑥𝑘𝑠 ),
and for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
Y𝑘𝑠
Y𝑘𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒. (6)
3.4 Equivalence of Belief, Price, and Utility Perturbations
The rst observation we make is that the three sources of perturbations are equivalent, in the
sense that for any 𝑒 a dataset is 𝑒-perturbed rationalizable according to one of the sources if and
only if it is also rationalizable according to any of the other sources with the same 𝑒 . By virtue
of this result, we can interpret our measure of deviations from OEU in any of the ways we have
introduced.
Theorem 1. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+, and 𝐷 be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rational;
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU rational;
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-utility-perturbed OEU rational.
The proof appears in Appendix A. In light of Theorem 1, we shall simply say that a dataset
is 𝑒-perturbed OEU rational if it is 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rational, and this will be equivalent to
being 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU rational, and 𝑒-utility-perturbed OEU rational.
3.5 Characterizations
We proceed to give a characterization of the dataset that are 𝑒-perturbed OEU rational. Speci -
cally, given 𝑒 ∈ R+, we propose a revealed preference axiom and prove that a dataset satis es the
axiom if and only if it is 𝑒-perturbed OEU rational.
Before we state the axiom, we need to introduce some additional notation. In the current
model, where `∗ is known and objective, what matters to an expected utility maximizer is not the
state price itself, but instead the risk-neutral price.
De nition 6. For any dataset (𝑝𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
, the risk neutral price 𝜌𝑘𝑠 ∈ R𝑆++ in choice problem 𝑘 at











pairs satisfying certain conditions.




)𝑛𝑖=1 is called a test sequence if




for all 𝑖 ;
(ii) each 𝑘 appears as 𝑘𝑖 (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as 𝑘′𝑖 (on the
right).
Echenique and Saito (2015) provide an axiom for OEU rationalization, termed the Strong Ax-

















SAROEU is equivalent to the axiom provided by Kübler et al. (2014).
It is easy to see why SAROEU is necessary for OEU rationalization. Assuming (for simplicity
of exposition) that 𝑢 is di erentiable, the rst-order condition of the maximization problem (2)








where _𝑘 > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier.





























To see that this term is smaller than 1, note that the rst term of the product of the _-ratios is
equal to one because of the condition (ii) of the test sequence: all _𝑘 must cancel out. The second
term of the product of 𝑢′-ratio is less than one because of the concavity of 𝑢, and the condition (i)




) ≤ 1). Thus, SAROEU is implied. It is more complicated
to show that SAROEU is su cient (see Echenique and Saito, 2015).
Now, 𝑒-perturbed OEU rationality allows the decision maker to use di erent beliefs `𝑘 ∈
Δ++(𝑆) for each choice problem 𝑘 . Consequently, SAROEU is not necessary for 𝑒-perturbed OEU
rationality. To see that SAROEU can be violated, note that the rst-order condition of the max-
imization (3) for choice 𝑘 is as follows: there exists a positive number (Lagrange multiplier) _𝑘
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Suppose that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘
𝑡 . Then (𝑥𝑘𝑠 , 𝑥𝑘𝑡 ) is a test sequence (of length one) according to Deni-





















Even though 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘
𝑡 implies the rst term of the ratio of 𝑢
′
is less than one, the second term can
be strictly larger than one. When 𝑥𝑘𝑠 is close enough to 𝑥
𝑘
𝑡 , the rst term is almost one while the
second term can be strictly larger than one. Consequently, SAROEU can be violated.
However, by (4), we know that the second term is bounded by 1 + 𝑒 . So we must have
𝜌𝑘𝑠
𝜌𝑘𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.




)𝑛𝑖=1 of pairs, one may suspect that the bound is calculated as
(1 + 𝑒)𝑛 . This is not true because if 𝑥𝑘𝑠 appears both as 𝑥
𝑘𝑖





for some 𝑗 (on the right of the pair), then all `𝑘𝑠 can be canceled out. What matters is the
number of times 𝑥𝑘𝑠 appears without being canceled out. This number can be de ned as follows.










)𝑛𝑖=1 ≡ 𝜎 . For any 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 ,













𝑑 (𝜎, 𝑘, 𝑠).
Note that, if 𝑑 (𝜎, 𝑘, 𝑠) is positive, then 𝑑 (𝜎, 𝑘, 𝑠) is the number of times `𝑘𝑠 appears as a nu-
merator without being canceled out. If it is negative, then 𝑑 (𝜎, 𝑘, 𝑠) is the number of times `𝑘𝑠
appears as a denominator without being canceled out. So𝑚(𝜎) is the “net” number of terms such
as `𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡 that are present in the numerator. Thus the relevant bound is (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎) .
Given the discussion above, it is easy to see that the following axiom is necessary for 𝑒-
perturbed OEU rationality.
Axiom 1 (𝑒-Perturbed Strong Axiom for Revealed Objective Expected Utility (𝑒-PSAROEU)). For















≤ (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎) .
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The main result of this section is to show that the axiom is also sucient.
Theorem 2. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, and let 𝐷 be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rational.
• 𝐷 satis es 𝑒-PSAROEU.
The proof appears in Appendix A.
Axioms like 𝑒-PSAROEU can be interpreted as a statement about downward-sloping demand
(see Echenique et al., 2020). For example, (𝑥𝑘𝑠 , 𝑥𝑘𝑠 ′) with 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘𝑠 ′ is a test sequence. If risk neutral
prices satisfy 𝜌𝑘𝑠 > 𝜌
𝑘
𝑠 ′ , then the dataset violates downward-sloping demand. Now 𝑒-PSAROEU
measures the extent of the violation by controlling the size of 𝜌𝑘𝑠 /𝜌𝑘𝑠 ′ .
In its connection to downward-sloping demand, Theorem 2 formalizes the idea of testing
OEU through the correlation of risk-neutral prices and quantities: see Friedman et al. (2018) and
our discussion in Section 4.2. Theorem 2 and the axiom 𝑒-PSAROEU give the precise form that
the downward-sloping demand property takes in order to characterize OEU, and provide a non-
parametric justi cation to the practice of analyzing the correlation of prices and quantities.
As mentioned, 0-PSAROEU is equivalent to SAROEU. When 𝑒 = ∞, the 𝑒-PSAROEU always
holds because (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎) = ∞.
Given a dataset, we shall calculate the smallest 𝑒 for which the dataset satis es 𝑒-PSAROEU.
It is easy to see that such a minimal level of 𝑒 exists.5 We explain in Online Appendices C and D
how it is calculated in practice.
De nition 9. Minimal 𝑒 , denoted 𝑒∗, is the smallest 𝑒′ ≥ 0 for which the data satis es 𝑒′-PSAROEU.
The number 𝑒∗ is a crucial component of our empirical analysis. Importantly, it is the basis of
a statistical procedure for testing the null hypothesis of OEU rationality.
As mentioned above, 𝑒∗ is a bound that has to hold across all observations, and therefore may
be sensitive to extreme outliers. It is, however, easy to check the sensitivity of the calculated
𝑒∗ to an extreme observation. One can, for example, re-calculate 𝑒∗ after dropping one or two
observations, and look for large changes.
Finally, 𝑒∗ depends on the prices and the objective probability which a decisionmaker faces. In
particular, it is clear from 𝑒-PSAROEU that 1+𝑒 is bounded by the maximum ratio of risk-neutral





We should mention that Theorem 2 is similar in spirit to some of the results in Allen and
Rehbeck (2020), who consider approximate rationalizability of quasilinear utility. They present
5
In Online Appendix C, we show that 𝑒∗ can be obtained as a solution of minimization of a continuous function
on a compact space. Hence, the minimum exists.
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a revealed preference characterization with a measure of error “built in” to the axiom, similar
to ours, which they then use as an input to a statistical test. The two papers were developed
independently, and since the models in question are very dierent, the results are unrelated.
4 Testing Objective Expected Utility
We apply our methodology to data from three large-scale online experiments. The experiments
were implemented through representative surveys, and the task involved objective risk, not un-
certainty. The data are taken from Choi et al. (2014, hereafter CKMS), Carvalho et al. (2016,
hereafter CMW), and Carvalho and Silverman (2019, hereafter CS). All three experiments share
a common experimental structure, the portfolio allocation task introduced by Loomes (1991) and
Choi et al. (2007).
It is worth mentioning again that the three studies focus on CCEI as a measure of violation of
basic rationality. We shall instead look at OEU, and use 𝑒∗ as our measure of violations of OEU.
The procedure for calculating 𝑒∗ is explained in Online Appendices C and D.
4.1 Datasets
In the experiments, subjects were presented with a sequence of decision problems under risk
in a graphical illustration of a two-dimensional budget line. They were asked to select a point
(𝑥1, 𝑥2), an “allocation,” by clicking on the budget line (subjects were therefore forced to exhaust
the income). The coordinates of the selected point represent an allocation of points between
“accounts” 1 and 2. They received the points allocated to one of the accounts, determined at




= 0.5). Subjects faced 25 budgets, as illustrated in Figure 3.
We note some interpretations of the design that matter for our posterior discussion. First,
points on the 45-degree line correspond to equal allocations between the two accounts and there-
fore involve no risk. The 45-degree line is the “full insurance” line. Second, we can interpret the
slope of a budget line as a price in the usual sense: if the𝑥2-intercept is larger than the𝑥1-intercept,
points in the account 2 are “cheaper” than those in the account 1.
Choi et al. (2014) implemented the task using the instrument of the CentERpanel, randomly
recruiting subjects from the entire panel sample in the Netherlands. Carvalho et al. (2016) admin-
istered the task using the GfK KnowledgePanel, a representative panel of the adult U.S. popula-
tion. Carvalho and Silverman (2019) used the Understanding America Study panel. The number

















Figure 3: Sample budget lines. A set of 25 budgets from one real subject in Choi et al. (2014).
The survey instruments in these studies allowed them to collect a wide variety of individual
demographic and economic information from the respondents. The main demographic infor-
mation they obtained include gender, age, education level, household income, occupation, and
household composition.
The selection of 25 budget lines was independent across subjects in CKMS (i.e., the subjects
were given dierent sets of budget lines), xed in CMW (i.e., all subjects saw the same set of
budgets), and semi-randomized across subjects in CS (i.e., each subject drew one of the prepared
sets of 25 budgets).
4.2 Results
Summary statistics. We exclude ve subjects who are “exactly” OEU rational, leaving us a
total of 3,719 subjects in the three experiments. About 76% of subjects never chose corners of
the budget lines, and there is only two percent of the entire sample who chose corners in more
than half of the 25 questions. Finally, no subjects chose corners in all 25 questions. Given these
observations, our focus on risk aversion does not seem to be too restrictive in these datasets.
We calculate 𝑒∗ for each individual subject. The distributions of 𝑒∗ are displayed in Fig-
ure 4A.
6,7
The CKMS sample has a mean 𝑒∗ of 3.034, and a median of 2.729. The CMW subjects
have a mean of 2.487 and a median of 2.533. The CS sample has a mean of 2.494 and a median
6
Earlier drafts of the paper (posted before summer 2019) reported log (1 + 𝑒∗), not 𝑒∗ itself.
7
The empirical CDF for the CMW data has several “steps” since all subjects faced with the same set of 25 budget
lines. For example, there are 172 subjects with 𝑒∗ = 3.5925. The maximum adjustment required to make their data






























Figure 4: Empirical CDFs of 𝑒∗. (A) All subjects. (B) The subsample of subjects with CCEI = 1. Notes: The
number of observations in each dataset is presented in parentheses.
of 2.088.
8
Recall that the smaller a subject’s 𝑒∗ is, the closer are her choices to OEU rationality. It
is, however, hard to exactly interpret the magnitude of 𝑒∗. We turn to this issue in Section 4.3.
Downward-sloping demand and 𝑒∗. Perturbations in beliefs, prices, or utility, seek to ac-
commodate a dataset so that it is OEU rationalizable. The accommodation can be seen as cor-
recting a mismatch of relative prices and marginal rates of substitution: recall our discussion
in the introduction. Another way to see the accommodation is through the relation between
prices and quantities. Our revealed preference axiom, 𝑒-PSAROEU, bounds certain deviations
from downward-sloping demand. The minimal 𝑒 is therefore a measure of the kinds of deviations
from downward-sloping demand that are crucial to OEU rationality.
Figure 5 illustrates this idea. We calculate the Spearman’s correlation coecient between
log(𝑥2/𝑥1) and log(𝑝2/𝑝1) for each subject in the datasets.9 Roughly speaking, downward-sloping
demand corresponds to the correlation between changes in quantities log(𝑥2/𝑥1), and changes in
prices log(𝑝2/𝑝1), being negative. The idea is that if a subject properly responds to price changes,
then as log(𝑥2/𝑥1) becomes larger, log(𝑥2/𝑥1) should become lower. The correlation is close to
zero if subjects do not respond to price changes.
The top panels of Figure 5 con rms that 𝑒∗ and the correlation between prices and quantities
are closely related. This means that subjects with smaller 𝑒∗ tend to exhibit downward-sloping
demand, while those with larger 𝑒∗ are insensitive to price changes. Across all three datasets, 𝑒∗
and downward-sloping demand are strongly and positively related.
The CCEI, on the other hand, is not clearly related to downward-sloping demand. As illus-
8
Since 𝑒∗ depends on the design of set(s) of budgets, comparing 𝑒∗ across studies requires caution.
9
Note that log(𝑥2/𝑥1) is not de ned at the corners. We thus adjust corner choices (less than 5% of all choices) by
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Figure 5: Correlation between log(𝑥2/𝑥1) and log(𝑝2/𝑝1) and measures of rationality. Panels: (A) CKMS,
(B) CMW, (C) CS. Notes: The vertical dashed line indicates the threshold below which Spearman’s cor-
relation is signicantly negative (one-sided, at the 1% level). Black curves represent LOESS smoothing
with 95% con dence bands.
trated in the bottom panels of Figure 5, the relation between CCEI and the correlation between
prices and quantities is not monotonic. Agents who are closer to complying with utility maxi-
mization do not necessarily display a stronger negtive correlation between prices and quantities.
The nding is consistent with our comment about CCEI, 𝑒∗, and OEU rationality: CCEI measures
the distance from utility maximization, which is related to parallel shifts in budget lines, while 𝑒∗
and OEU are about the slope of the budget lines, and about a negative relation between quantities
and prices.
We should mention the practice by some authors, notably, Friedman et al. (2018), to evaluate
compliance with OEU by looking at the correlation between risk-neutral prices and quantities.
Our 𝑒∗ is related to that idea, and the empirical results presented in this section can be read as a
validation of the correlational approach. Friedman et al. (2018) use their approach to estimate a
parametric functional form, using experimental data in which they vary objective probabilities,
not just prices. Our approach is non-parametric, and focused on testing OEU itself, not estimating
any particular utility speci cation.
First-order stochastic dominance and 𝑒∗. In the experiments we consider, choosing (𝑥1, 𝑥2)
at prices (𝑝1, 𝑝2) violates monotonicity with respect to rst-order stochastic dominance (hereafter
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Figure 6: Violation of FOSD-monotonicity and measures of rationality. Black curves represent LOESS
smoothing with 95% condence bands. Panels: (A) CKMS, (B) CMW, (C) CS.
two states have the same objective probability in our datasets, choosing a greater payo in the
more expensive state violates FOSD-monotonicity. Violations of FOSD-monotonicity are related
to downward-sloping demand, as they involve consuming more in the more expensive state.
Choices that violate FOSD-monotonicity are not uncommon in the data (see OnlineAppendix F.1).
Since OEU-rational choices must satisfy FOSD-monotonicity, 𝑒∗ = 0 implies no violations of
FOSD-monotonicity. Moreover, the value of 𝑒∗ is a good indicator of FOSD-monotonicity viola-
tions. See the positive relationship between the fraction of FOSD-monotonicity violations and 𝑒∗
in the top row of Figure 6: subjects who frequently made choices violating FOSD-monotonicity
tend to have larger 𝑒∗ compared to those with fewer such violations.
The relation between 𝑒∗ and violations of FOSD-monotonicity stands in sharp contrast with
CCEI. First, choices that violate FOSD-monotonicity can be consistent with GARP. Our data ex-
hibits subjects that pass GARP while making choices that violate FOSD-monotonicity (an empir-
ical fact that was rst pointed out by Choi et al., 2014). The bottom panels of Figure 6 show that
a substantial number of subjects with perfect compliance with GARP (CCEI = 1) make at least
one violation of FOSD-monotonicity. The existence of these subjects generates a nonmonotonic
relationship between CCEI and the frequency of violation of FOSD-monotonicity.
Typical patterns of choices. We can gain some insights into the data by considering “typical”
patterns of choice. Figure 7 presents choice patterns from selected subjects with CCEI = 1 and
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varying degrees of 𝑒∗.10 Panels A-F plot observed choices and panels a-f plot the relationship
between log(𝑥2/𝑥1) and log(𝑝2/𝑝1) associated with each choice pattern. As discussed above,
panels a-f should exhibit a negative relationship (downward-sloping demand) for the subject to
be OEU rational.
Panel A presents a choice pattern that is “almost” consistent with OEU. The relation between
log(𝑥2/𝑥1) and log(𝑝2/𝑝1) ts close to a line with negative slope, but there is a small deviation
around log(𝑝2/𝑝1) = −1 which makes the subject’s 𝑒∗ nonzero. Panel B also shows a pattern
that does not involve any FOSD-monotonicity violations but is not OEU rational due to small
deviations from the downward-sloping demand (see panel b). The pattern in panel C exhibits
larger deviations from the downward-sloping demand (panel c), which push its 𝑒∗ higher than
the previous two subjects.
The subject’s choices in panel D are close to the 45-degree line. At rst glance, such choices
might seem to be rationalizable by a very risk-averse expected utility function. However, as
panel d shows, the subject’s choices deviate from the downward-sloping demand property, and
hence cannot be rationalized by any risk-averse expected utility function. Note that the “size” of
the deviation from the downward-sloping demand is small (see the scale of the 𝑦-axis in panel d).
One might be able to rationalize the choices made in panel D with some models of errors in
choices, but not with the types of errors captured by our model.
11
We will discuss other two
subjects (panels E and F) below.
Figure 7 also illustrates how 𝑒∗ operates in practice when there are two states. Under the price-
perturbation interpretation, it measures how big of an adjustment of prices would be needed to
satisfy downward-sloping demand. Such adjustments will be represented as “horizontal shifts”
of points in the bottom panels of the gure (since we x the chosen bundle and rotate the budget
line), and the largest adjustment corresponds to 𝑒∗. A scatterplot of log(𝑥2/𝑥1) versus log(𝑝2/𝑝1),
as in panels a-f of Figure 7, works as a graphical tool to get a sense of whether a subject’s 𝑒∗
is big or small. Online Appendix F.5 discusses this idea, and illustrates 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU
rationalization using the choice data presented in Figure 7.
Relationship between 𝑒∗, CCEI, and EU-CCEI. CCEI serves a di erent purpose than 𝑒∗; it is
meant to capture deviations from general utility maximization, and not OEU. Nevertheless, it is
10
The patterns in Figure 7 are not an exhaustive list by any means. See Online Appendix F.7 for more examples.
11
This is, in our opinion, a strength of our approach. We do not ex-post seek to invent a model of errors that might
rescue EU. Instead we have written down what we think are natural sources of errors and perturbation (random
utility, beliefs, and measurement errors). Our results deal with what can be rationalized when these sources of
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Figure 7: Choice patterns from six subjects in the CMWdatawith CCEI = 1 and varying 𝑒∗. (A-F) Observed
choices. (a-f) The relation between log(𝑥2/𝑥1) and log(𝑝2/𝑝1). Notes: Choices in shaded areas violate
FOSD-monotonicity. 𝑟 indicates the Spearman’s correlation coecient and 𝑓 indicates the fraction of
choices violating FOSD-monotonicity. In this data, median CCEI is 0.889, median EU-CCEI is 0.730, and




















































































Figure 8: Correlation between 𝑒∗ and CCEI (top panels) and EU-CCEI of Polisson et al. (2020) (bottom
panels). Panels: (A) CKMS, (B) CMW, (C) CS.
informative to understand the relationship between these measures in the data. We also comment
on the recent proposal by Polisson et al. (2020) of an adaptation of CCEI to test for OEU.
We observe, in Figure 4, that the distribution of 𝑒∗ among subjects whose CCEI is equal to
one (panel B) varies as much as in thw whole population (panel A). Many subjects have CCEI
equal to one, but their 𝑒∗’s can be far from zero. This means that consistency with general utility
maximization is not necessarily a good indication of consistency with OEU.
That said, the measures are clearly correlated. Figure 8, top panels, plot the relation between
CCEI and 𝑒∗. As we expect from their denitions (larger CCEI and smaller 𝑒∗ correspond to higher
consistency), there is a negative and signi cant relation between them (Spearman’s correlation
coe cient: 𝑟 = −0.18 for CKMS, 𝑟 = −0.11 for CMW, 𝑟 = −0.35 for CS, all 𝑝 < 0.001). Of course,
subjects that are consistent with OEU as measured by 𝑒∗ (they have 𝑒∗ = 0) must exhibit CCEI = 1.
Notice that the variability of the CCEI widens as 𝑒∗ becomes larger. Obviously, subjects with
a small 𝑒∗ are close to being consistent with general utility maximization, and therefore have a
CCEI that is close to one. However, subjects with large 𝑒∗ seem to have dispersed values of CCEI.
Polisson et al. (2020) propose a version of CCEI meant to measure departures from EU using
their GRID method. We term this measure EU-CCEI. In contrast with our measure 𝑒∗, which
assumes risk aversion and is based on rotating budget lines, EU-CCEI does not impose risk aver-
sion and uses the same idea of shrinking budget lines as in standard CCEI. The bottom panels of
Figure 8 exhibit the relationship between 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI. It is clear that the relation between 𝑒∗
and EU-CCEI is similar to that between 𝑒∗ and CCEI. The two measures are strongly correlated,
24
but they also provide dierent conclusions for many subjects.
There are many subjects that EU-CCEI deems consistent with OEU, but have high levels of
𝑒∗. This could be attributed to the more restrictive theory being tested by 𝑒∗. Subjects with EU-
CCEI close to one and large 𝑒∗ could simply be non-risk-averse OEU maximizers. Perhaps more
puzzling is the existence of subjects that 𝑒∗ sees as close to OEUwhile EU-CCEI does not: subjects
with small values of both 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI.
It is hard to investigate the di erences between EU-CCEI and 𝑒∗ methodologically. EU-CCEI
does not specify a source of deviations from OEU, so we cannot say that one measure emphasizes
one source of errors and the other a di erent source. Instead, we look at some of the patterns in
the data that gives rise to di erences. An example of a choice pattern in which 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI
di er is provided by Figure 7, panel D. The subject in question exhibits CCEI = EU-CCEI = 1,
while 𝑒∗ is large and indicates a violation of OEU. (The pattern involves choices close to the 45-
degree line, but with a clear violation of downward sloping demand, see panel d.) Panels E and F
exhibit subjects that 𝑒∗ says are close to (risk-averse) OEU, but EU-CCEI deems far from OEU. We
see in panels e and f that the conclusion using 𝑒∗ can be understood by the subjects’ compliance
with downward sloping demand. The subjects in panels E and F make a few FOSD-monotonicity
violations, which might explain the behavior of EU-CCEI, but that cannot be the end of the story
because the subject in panel D makes substantial FOSD-monotonicity violations and exhibits the
opposite behavior of 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI. Finally, we should say that there aremany other patterns for
which the conclusions of 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI di er: see Online Appendices F.2 and F.7 for additional
examples.
In OnlineAppendix F.6, we examine the relationship between 𝑒∗ andmodi ed CCEI indices for
two additional models considered in Polisson et al. (2020): stochastically monotone utility max-
imization and risk-averse EU. We call these indices F-GARP and cEU-CCEI, respectively. Their
values are reported for the patterns in Figure 7; see Figures F.15-F.17 in the Online Appendix for
pairwise scatter plots of ve indices (CCEI, F-GARP, EU-CCEI, cEU-CCEI, and 𝑒∗). The modi ed
CCEI measures provide a more re ned index for consistency for EU than CCEI, but di erences
with 𝑒∗ persist. In fact, the basic conclusions outlined in the comparison between 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI
hold true for these indices.
Correlation with demographic characteristics. We investigate the correlation between our
measure of consistency with OEU, 𝑒∗, and various demographic variables available in the data.
The exercise is analogous to ndings in Choi et al. (2014) that use CCEI.
We nd that younger subjects, those who have high cognitive abilities, and those who are
working, are closer to being consistent withOEU than older, low ability, or non-working, subjects.

























































































































Figure 9: Correlation between 𝑒∗ and demographic variables. Notes: Bars represent standard errors of
means.
males, are closer to OEU. Figure 9 summarizes the mean 𝑒∗ (along with the standard error of
mean) across several socioeconomic categories. We use the same categorization as in Choi et al.
(2014) to compare our results with their Figure 3.
We observe statistically signicant (at the 5% level) gender di erences in CS (Welch’s 𝑡 =
−3.21, df = 1381.7, 𝑝 = 0.001) but not in CKMS (Welch’s 𝑡 = −0.37, df = 1162.8, 𝑝 = 0.708) and
CMW (Welch’s 𝑡 = −1.35, df = 715.5, 𝑝 = 0.178). Male subjects were on average closer to OEU
rationality than female subjects in the CS sample (panel A).
We nd signi cant e ects of age in all three datasets. Panel B shows that younger subjects are
on average closer to OEU rationality than older subjects (the comparison between age groups 16-
34 and 65+ reveals a statistically signi cant di erence in all three datasets; all Welch’s 𝑡-tests give
𝑝 < 0.001).
We observe weak e ects of education on 𝑒∗ (panel C).12 Subjects with higher education are on
12
The low, medium, and high education levels correspond to primary or prevocational secondary education, pre-
university secondary education or senior vocational training, and vocational college or university education, respec-
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average closer to OEU than those with lower education in CKMS (Welch’s 𝑡 = 3.11, df = 826.9,
𝑝 = 0.002), but the dierence is not signi cant in the CMW and CS (Welch’s 𝑡 = 1.43, df = 121.6,
𝑝 = 0.155 in CMW; Welch’s 𝑡 = 1.06, df = 47.2, 𝑝 = 0.295 in CS).
Panel D shows that subjects who were working at the time of the survey are on average
closer to OEU than those who were not (Wlech’s 𝑡 = 2.03, df = 865.1, 𝑝 = 0.043 in CKMS;
Welch’s 𝑡 = 2.04, df = 469.8, 𝑝 = 0.042 in CMW; Welch’s 𝑡 = 2.82, df = 972.0, 𝑝 = 0.005 in CS).
In panels E1 and E2, we classify subjects according to their Cognitive Re ection Test score
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) or average reaction times in the numerical Stroop task.
13
The average 𝑒∗
for those who correctly answered two questions or more of the CRT is lower than the average for
those who answered at most one question (Welch’s 𝑡 = −3.16, df = 929.4, 𝑝 = 0.002). Subjects
with lower response times in the numerical Stroop task have signi cantly lower 𝑒∗ (Welch’s 𝑡 =
−2.78, df = 1101.8, 𝑝 = 0.005).
One of the key ndings in Choi et al. (2014) is that consistency with utility maximization as
measured by CCEI correlates with household wealth. When we look at the relation between 𝑒∗
and household income, there is a negative trend but the di erences across income brackets are
not statistically signi cant (bracket “0-2.5k” vs. “5k+”, Welch’s 𝑡 = 1.02, df = 527.5, 𝑝 = 0.309;
panel F1). Panel F2 presents a similar result between subjects who earned more than 20 thousand
USD annually or not in the CMW sample (Welch’s 𝑡 = 0.64697, df = 1011.3, 𝑝 = 0.518). When we
compare poor households (annual income less than 20 thousand USD) and wealthy households
(annual income more than 100 thousand USD) from the CS sample, average 𝑒∗ is signi cantly
smaller for the latter sample (Welch’s 𝑡 = 2.468, df = 852.7, 𝑝 = 0.014; panel F3).
Robustness of the results. The measure 𝑒∗ is a bound that has to hold across all observations
and states (see conditions (4), (5), and (6) in the de nitions of 𝑒-perturbed OEU). One may wonder
how sensitive 𝑒∗ is to a small number of “bad” choices. Online Appendix F.3 presents two robust-
ness checks. In the rst robustness check, we recalculate 𝑒∗ using subsets of observed choices
after dropping one or two “critical mistakes”. More precisely, for each subject, we calculate 𝑒∗ for
all combinations of 25 −𝑚 (𝑚 = 1, 2) choices and pick the smallest 𝑒∗ among them. In the second
robustness check, we calculate the “average” perturbation necessary to rationalize the data to
mitigate the e ect of extreme mistakes. These alternative ways of calculating 𝑒∗ do not change
the general pattern of correlation between 𝑒∗ and CCEI or 𝑒∗ and demographic variables. The
tively.
13
CRT consists of three questions, all of which have an intuitive and spontaneous, but incorrect, answers, and a
deliberative and correct answer. In the numerical Stroop task, subjects are presented with a number, such as 888, and
are asked to identify the number of times the digit is repeated (in this example the answer is “3”, while an “intuitive”
response is “8”). It has been shown that response times in this task capture the subject’s cognitive control ability.
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main empirical results are robust to the presence of a small number of bad choices.
4.3 Minimum Perturbation Test
Our discussion so far has sidestepped one issue: How are we to interpret the absolute magnitude
of 𝑒∗? When can we say that 𝑒∗ is large enough to “reject” consistency with OEU rationality? To
answer this question, we present a statistical test of the hypothesis that an agent is OEU rational.
The test needs some assumptions, but it gives us a threshold level (a critical value) for 𝑒∗. Any
value of 𝑒∗ that exceeds the threshold indicates inconsistency with OEU at some given statistical
signicance level.
Our approach follows the methodology laid out in Echenique et al. (2011) and Echenique et al.
(2016). First, we adopt the price perturbation interpretation of 𝑒 in Section 3.2, that is we consider
an agent who may misperceive prices. The advantage of doing so is that we can use the observed
variability in price to get a handle on the assumptions we need to make on perturbed prices. To










𝑠 > 0 for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 . Prices 𝑝𝑘 are prices 𝑝𝑘 measured
with error, or misperceived.
If the variance of Y is large, it will be easy to accommodate a dataset as OEU rational. The larger
is the variance of Y, the larger the magnitudes of 𝑒 that can rationalize a dataset as consistent with
OEU. In other words, we can attribute the agent’s large 𝑒 as his misperception of prices rather
than his violation of EU rationality. Our procedure is thus sensitive to the assumptions we make
about the variance of Y.
To get a handle on the variance of Y, our approach is to assume that an agent mistakes true
prices 𝑝 with perturbed prices 𝑝 . The distributions of 𝑝 and 𝑝 should be similar enough that
the agent might plausibly confuse the two. To make this operational, we imagine an agent who
conducts a statistical test for the variance of prices. If the true variance of 𝑝 is 𝜎2
0
and the implied




, then the agent would conduct a test for the null of 𝜎2 = 𝜎2
0
against the
alternative of 𝜎2 = 𝜎2
1
. We want the variances to be close enough that the agent might reasonably
get inconclusive results from such a test (i.e., the agent may reasonably mistake true prices 𝑝 with
perturbed prices 𝑝 , as we assumed). Speci cally, we assume the sum of probabilities of type I and
type II errors in this test is relatively large.14 The details of how we design the test are presented
in Online Appendix E.
The main results are summarized in Figure 10. The probability of a type I error is [𝐼 and the
14
The problem of variance is pervasive in statistical implementations of revealed preference tests, see Varian
(1990), Echenique et al. (2011), and Echenique et al. (2016) for example. The use of the sum of type I and type II errors






































































































































































































































Figure 10: Rejection rates under each combination of type I and type II error probabilities ([𝐼 , [II ). Panels:
(A) CKMS, (B) CMW, (C) CS.
probability of a type II error is [II . Recall that we focus on situations where [𝐼 + [II is relatively
large, as we want our consumer to plausibly mistake the distributions of 𝑝 and 𝑝 . Consider, for
example, our results for CKMS. The outermost numbers assume that [𝐼 + [II = 0.7. For such
numbers, the rejection rates range from 5% to 30%. This means that if prices 𝑝 and 𝑝 are close
enough so that the agent may misperceive the prices and make type I and type II errors with
probability 70%, then we can reject the hypothesis that the agent is an OEU maximizer at most
30% of the cases.
Overall, it is fair to say that rejection rates of the hypothesis that the decision maker is an
OEU miximizer are modest. Notice also that smaller values of [𝐼 + [II corresponds to smaller
rejection rates. This is because when values of [𝐼 + [II are smaller (i.e., the decision maker does
not misperceive prices much), the dierence between 𝑝 and 𝑝 should be large, which corresponds
to larger variances of Y. Larger variance, in turn, leads to smaller rejection rates. The gure also
illustrates that the conclusions of the test are very sensitive to what one assumes about variances,
through the assumptions about [𝐼 and [II . But if we look at the largest rejection rates, for the
largest values of [𝐼 +[II , we get 30% for CKMS, 11% for CMW, and 21% for CS. Hence, while many
subjects in the experiments are inconsistent with OEU, for most of these subjects, our statistical
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tests would attribute such inconsistency to misperception of prices and do not reject that the
subjects are OEU maximizers.
5 Perturbed Subjective Expected Utility
We now turn to the model of subjective expected utility (SEU), in which beliefs are not known.
Instead, beliefs are subjective and unobservable. The analysis will be analogous towhat we did for
OEU, and therefore proceed at a faster pace. In particular, all the denitions and results parallel
those of the section on OEU. The proof of the main result (the axiomatic characterization) is
substantially more challenging here because both beliefs and utilities are unknown: there is a
classical problem in disentangling beliefs from utility. The technique for solving this problemwas
introduced in Echenique and Saito (2015). The proofs of the theorems are in Online Appendix B.
De nition 10. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is 𝑒-belief-perturbed SEU rational if there exist
`𝑘 ∈ Δ++(𝑆) for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and a concave and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R such that,
for all 𝑘 ,
𝑦 ∈ 𝐵(𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 · 𝑥𝑘) =⇒
∑︁
𝑠∈𝑆
`𝑘𝑠 𝑢 (𝑦𝑠) ≤
∑︁
𝑠∈𝑆
`𝑘𝑠 𝑢 (𝑥𝑘𝑠 )
and for each 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`𝑙𝑠/`𝑙𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒. (8)
Note that the de nition of 𝑒-belief-perturbed SEU rationality di ers from the de nition of
𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rationality, only in condition (8), establishing bounds on perturbations.
Here there is no objective probability from which we can evaluate the deviation of the set {`𝑘}
of beliefs. Thus we evaluate perturbations among beliefs, as in (8).
Remark 1. The constraint on the perturbation applies for each 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 , so it implies
for each 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`𝑙𝑠/`𝑙𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.
Hence, when 𝑒 = 0, it must be that `𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡 = `𝑙𝑠/`𝑙𝑡 . This implies that `𝑘 = `𝑙 for a dataset that is
0-belief perturbed SEU rational.
Next, we propose perturbed SEU rationality with respect to prices.
De nition 11. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is 𝑒-price-perturbed SEU rational if there exist
` ∈ Δ++(𝑆) and a concave and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R and Y𝑘 ∈ R𝑆+ for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
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such that, for all 𝑘 ,













and for each 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆
Y𝑘𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡
Y𝑙𝑠/Y𝑙𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒. (9)
Again, the denition di ers from the corresponding de nition of price-perturbed OEU ratio-
nality only in condition (9), establishing bounds on perturbations. In condition (9), we measure




not Y𝑘𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡 as in (5). This change is necessary to accommodate the existence of subjective beliefs. By
choosing subjective beliefs appropriately, one can neutralize the perturbation in prices if Y𝑘𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡 =
Y𝑙𝑠/Y𝑙𝑡 for all 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 . That is, as long as Y𝑘𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡 = Y𝑙𝑠/Y𝑙𝑡 for all 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 , if we can rationalize the
dataset by introducing the noise with some subjective belief `, then without using the noise, we
can rationalize the dataset with another subjective belief `′ such that Y𝑘𝑠 `
′
𝑠/Y𝑘𝑡 `′𝑡 = `𝑠/`𝑡 .
Finally, we de ne utility-perturbed SEU rationality.
De nition 12. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+. A dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is 𝑒-utility-perturbed SEU rational if there exist
` ∈ Δ++(𝑆), a concave and strictly increasing function 𝑢 : R+ → R, and Y𝑘 ∈ R𝑆+ for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 such
that, for all 𝑘 ,










𝑠 𝑢 (𝑥𝑘𝑠 ),
and for each 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆
Y𝑘𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡
Y𝑙𝑠/Y𝑙𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.
As in the previous section, given 𝑒 , we can show that these three concepts of rationality are
equivalent.
Theorem 3. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+ and 𝐷 be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-belief-perturbed SEU rational;
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-price-perturbed SEU rational;
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-utility-perturbed SEU rational.
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In light of Theorem 3, we shall speak simply of 𝑒-perturbed SEU rationality to refer to any of
the above notions of perturbed SEU rationality.
Echenique and Saito (2015) prove that a dataset is SEU rational if and only if it satises a
revealed-preference axiom termed the Strong Axiom for Revealed Subjective Expected Utility




)𝑛𝑖=1, if each 𝑠 appears as 𝑠𝑖 (on the












SARSEU is no longer necessary for perturbed SEU-rationality. This is easy to see, as we allow
the decision maker to have a di erent belief `𝑘 for each choice 𝑘 , and reason as in our discussion
of SAROEU. Analogous to our analysis of OEU, we introduce a perturbed version of SARSEU to
capture perturbed SEU rationality. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+.




)𝑛𝑖=1 ≡ 𝜎 , if each 𝑠











≤ (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎) .
We can easily see the necessity of 𝑒-PSARSEU by reasoning from the rst-order conditions,
as in our discussion of 𝑒-PSAROEU. The main result of this section shows that 𝑒-PSARSEU is not
only necessary for 𝑒-perturbed SEU rationality, but also su cient.
Theorem 4. Let 𝑒 ∈ R+ and 𝐷 be a dataset. The following are equivalent:
• 𝐷 is 𝑒-perturbed SEU rational;
• 𝐷 satis es 𝑒-PSARSEU.
It is easy to see that 0-PSARSEU is equivalent to SARSEU, and that by choosing 𝑒 to be ar-
bitrarily large it is possible to rationalize any dataset. As a consequence, we shall be interested
in nding a minimal value of 𝑒 that rationalizes a dataset. Echenique et al. (2019) apply the idea
to datasets of choice under uncertainty collected in the laboratory as well as on the large-scale
online survey of the general U.S. population.
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6 Conclusion
We present a measure of deviations from expected utility theory, called minimal 𝑒 (or 𝑒∗), that is
based on a revealed-preference characterization of the “perturbed” version of the model.
We start from an observation that the empirical content of EU is captured by the relation
between prices and marginal rates of substitution. We measure the deviations from EU by the
smallest amount of perturbations one needs to add in order to get the “right” relation between
prices and marginal rates of substitution. There are three components of the EU model, beliefs,
prices, and utilities, which we can perturb, but we can interpret the measure in any of the ways
(Theorem 1).
We apply our method to data from three large-scale experiments and nd that the measure
delivers additional insights on datasets that had been analyzed with CCEI, a measure of consis-
tency with general utility maximization. Our measure can be used as an additional toolkit for
data analysis in empirical studies employing choices from linear budgets.
Appendix A Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First we prove a lemma that implies Theorem 1, and is useful for the su ciency part of Theorem 2.
The lemma provides “Afriat inequalities” for the problem at hand.
Lemma 1. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, and let (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 be a dataset. The following statements are equivalent.
(a) (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rational.
(b) There are strictly positive numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , _








𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , (10)
and for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`∗𝑠 /`∗𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒. (11)
(c) (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU rational.
(d) There are strictly positive numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , ˆ_














and for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
Y𝑘𝑠
Y𝑘𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.
(e) (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is 𝑒-utility-perturbed OEU rational.
(f) There are strictly positive numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , ˆ_










𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ ,
and for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
Ŷ𝑘𝑠
Ŷ𝑘𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.
Proof. The equivalence between (a) and (b), the equivalence between (c) and (d), and the equiva-
lence between (e) and (f) follow from arguments in Echenique and Saito (2015). The equivalence
between (d) and (f) with Y𝑘𝑠 = 1/Ŷ𝑘𝑠 for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is straightforward. Thus, to show the
result, it suces to show that (b) and (d) are equivalent.
















for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 . Then, `𝑘 ∈ Δ++(𝑆). Since `∗𝑠 𝑣𝑘𝑠 = ˆ_𝑘Y𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑘𝑠 , we have `𝑘𝑠 𝑣𝑘𝑠 = _𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑠 .












≤ 1 + 𝑒 .
To show that (b) implies (d), for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 de ne 𝑣 = 𝑣 and for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , ˆ_𝑘 = _𝑘 . For all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , de ne Y𝑘𝑠 =
`∗𝑠
`𝑘𝑠
. For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , since `𝑘𝑠 𝑢𝑘𝑠 = _𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑠 , we have `∗𝑠 𝑣𝑘𝑠 = ˆ_𝑘Y𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑘𝑠 .















≤ 1 + 𝑒 . 
A.2 Proof of the Necessity Direction of Theorem 2
Lemma 2. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, if a dataset is 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU rational, then the dataset satis es
𝑒-PSAROEU.




)𝑛𝑖=1 ≡ 𝜎 of pairs that satis es conditions (i) and (ii) in De nition 7.





















































































































In the following, we evaluate the right hand side. For each (𝑘, 𝑠), we rst cancel out all the
terms `𝑘𝑠 that can be canceled out. Then, the number of `
𝑘
𝑠 ’s that remain in the numerator is
𝑑 (𝜎, 𝑘, 𝑠), as in De nition 8. Since the number of terms in the numerator and the denominator
must be the same, the number of remaining fractions is𝑚(𝜎) ≡ ∑𝑠∈𝑆 ∑𝑘∈𝐾 :𝑑 (𝜎,𝑘,𝑠)>0 𝑑 (𝜎, 𝑘, 𝑠). So



































. Since the sequence is obtained by can-
celing out 𝑥𝑘𝑠 from the rst element and the second element of the pairs, and since the original




)𝑛𝑖=1 satis es condition (ii), it follows that (𝑥
𝑘 𝑗






satis es condition (ii).
By condition (ii), we can assume without loss of generality that 𝑘 𝑗 = 𝑘
′
𝑗 for each 𝑗 . Therefore,














≤ (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎) .








) ≤ (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎) . 
A.3 Proof of the Su ciency Direction of Theorem 2
We need three lemmas to prove the su ciency direction. The idea behind the argument is the
same as in Echenique and Saito (2015). We know from Lemma 1 that it su ces to nd a solution to
the relevant system of Afriat inequalities. We take logarithms to linearize the Afriat inequalities
in Lemma 1. Then we set up the problem to nd a solution to the system of linear inequalities.
The rst lemma, Lemma 3, shows that 𝑒-PSAROEU is su cient for 𝑒-belief-perturbed OEU
rationality under the assumption that the logarithms of the prices are rational numbers. The as-
sumption of rational logarithms comes from our use of a version of the theorem of the alternative
(see Lemma 12 in Appendix B.4): when there is no solution to the linearized Afriat inequalities,
a rational solution to the dual system of inequalities exists. Then we construct a violation of
𝑒-PSAROEU from the given solution to the dual.
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The second lemma, Lemma 4, establishes that we can approximate any dataset satisfying
𝑒-PSAROEU with a dataset for which the logarithms of prices are rational, and for which 𝑒-
PSAROEU is satised.
The last lemma, Lemma 5, establishes the result by using another version of the theorem of
the alternative, stated as Lemma 11.
The rest of the section is devoted to the statement of these lemmas.
Lemma 3. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, let a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒-PSAROEU. Suppose that log(𝑝
𝑘
𝑠 ) ∈ Q
for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , log(`∗𝑠 ) ∈ Q for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , and log(1 + 𝑒) ∈ Q. Then there are numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ,
_𝑘 , `𝑘𝑠 for 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 satisfying (10) and (11) in Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, let a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒-PSAROEU with respect to `
∗. Then for
all positive numbers Y, there exist a positive real numbers 𝑒′ ∈ [𝑒, 𝑒 + Y], `′𝑠 ∈ [`∗𝑠 − Y, `∗𝑠 + Y], and
𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ [𝑝𝑘𝑠 − Y, 𝑝𝑘𝑠 ] for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 such that log𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ Q for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , log(`′𝑠) ∈ Q
for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , and log(1 + 𝑒′) ∈ Q, `′ ∈ Δ++(𝑆), and the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒
′-PSAROEU with
respect to `′.
Lemma 5. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, let a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒-PSAROEU with respect to `. Then there
are numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , _
𝑘 , `𝑘𝑠 for 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 satisfying (10) and (11) in Lemma 1.
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is similar to the proof of the main result in Echenique and Saito (2015), which corre-
sponds to the case 𝑒 = 0. By log-linearizing the equation in system (10) and the inequality (11) in
Lemma 1, we have for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , such that
log `𝑘𝑠 + log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 = log _𝑘 + log𝑝𝑘𝑠 , (12)
𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘 ′
𝑠 ′ =⇒ log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ log 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , (13)
and for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
− log(1 + 𝑒) + log `∗𝑠 − log `∗𝑡 ≤ log `𝑘𝑠 − log `𝑘𝑡 ≤ log(1 + 𝑒) + log `∗𝑠 − log `∗𝑡 . (14)
We are going to write the system of inequalities (12)-(14) in matrix form, following Echenique
and Saito (2015) with some modi cations.
Let 𝐴 be a matrix with 𝐾 × 𝑆 rows and 2(𝐾 × 𝑆) + 𝐾 + 1 columns, de ned as follows: We
have one row for every pair (𝑘, 𝑠), two columns for every pair (𝑘, 𝑠), one columns for each 𝑘 ,
and one last column. In the row corresponding to (𝑘, 𝑠), the matrix has zeroes everywhere with
36
the following exceptions: it has 1’s in columns for (𝑘, 𝑠); it has a −1 in the column for 𝑘 ; it has
− log𝑝𝑘𝑠 in the very last column. Matrix 𝐴 looks as follows:













(𝑘,𝑠) · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log𝑝𝑘𝑠
(𝑘,𝑡) · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log𝑝𝑘𝑡
(𝑙,𝑠) · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 −1 · · · − log𝑝𝑙𝑠














Next, we write the system of inequalities (13) and (14) in a matrix form. There is one row in
matrix 𝐵 for each pair (𝑘, 𝑠) and (𝑘′, 𝑠′) for which 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′





we have zeroes everywhere with the exception of a −1 in the column for (𝑘, 𝑠) and a 1 in the
column for (𝑘′, 𝑠′). Matrix 𝐵 has additional rows, that capture the system of inequalities (14), as
follows:













· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · 1 −1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + 𝑒) − log `∗𝑠 + log `∗𝑡
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + 𝑒) + log `∗𝑠 − log `∗𝑡
· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0 0 −1 1 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + 𝑒) + log `∗𝑠 − log `∗𝑡














Finally, we have a matrix 𝐸 which has a single row and has zeroes everywhere except for 1 in
the last column.
To sum up, there is a solution to the system (12)-(14) if and only if there is a vector 𝑢 ∈
R2(𝐾×𝑆)+𝐾+1 that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
𝑆1 :

𝐴 · 𝑢 = 0,
𝐵 · 𝑢 ≥ 0,
𝐸 · 𝑢 > 0.
The entries of 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐸 are either 0, 1 or −1, with the exception of the last column of 𝐴
and 𝐵. Under the hypotheses of the lemma we are proving, the last column consists of rational
numbers. By Motzkin’s theorem, then, there is such a solution 𝑢 to 𝑆1 if and only if there is no
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rational vector (\, [, 𝜋) that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
𝑆2 :

\ · 𝐴 + [ · 𝐵 + 𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0,
[ ≥ 0,
𝜋 > 0.
In the following, we shall prove that the non-existence of a solution 𝑢 implies that the dataset
must violate 𝑒-PSAROEU. Suppose then that there is no solution 𝑢 and let (\, [, 𝜋) be a rational
vector as above, solving system 𝑆2.
The outline of the rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Echenique and Saito (2015). Since
(\, [, 𝜋) are rational vectors, by multiplying a large enough integer, we can make the vectors
integers. Then we transform the matrices𝐴 and 𝐵 using \ and [. (i) If \𝑟 > 0, then creat \𝑟 copies
of the 𝑟 th row; (ii) omitting row 𝑟 when \𝑟 = 0; and (iii) if \𝑟 < 0, then \𝑟 copies of the 𝑟 th row
multiplied by −1.
Similarly, we create a new matrix by including the same columns as 𝐵 and [𝑟 copies of each
row (and thus omitting row 𝑟 when [𝑟 = 0; recall that [𝑟 ≥ 0 for all 𝑟 ).
By using the transformed matrices and the fact that \ ·𝐴 + [ · 𝐵 + 𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0 and [ ≥ 0, we can
prove the following claims:




)𝑛∗𝑖=1 ≡ 𝜎 of pairs that satises conditions (i) and (ii) in
De nition 7.




)𝑛∗𝑖=1 in a similar way to the proof of Lemma 11 of






for all 𝑖 .
In the following, we show that the sequence satis es condition (ii) that each𝑘 appears as𝑘𝑖 the
same number of times it appears as 𝑘′𝑖 . Let 𝑛(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) ≡ #{𝑖 | 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑥
𝑘𝑖





It su ces to show that for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , ∑𝑠∈𝑆 [𝑛(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) − 𝑛′(𝑥𝑘𝑠 )] = 0.
Recall our construction of the matrix 𝐵. We have a constraint for each triple (𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡) with
𝑠 < 𝑡 . Denote the weight on the rows capturing
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`∗𝑠 /`∗𝑡





[ (𝑘, 𝑡, 𝑠).
For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , in the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 in matrix 𝐴, remember that we
have 1 if we have 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑥
𝑘𝑖




for some 𝑖 . This is because a row
in 𝐴 must have 1 (−1) in the column corresponding to 𝑣𝑘𝑠 if and only if it has 1 (−1, respectively)
in the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 . By summing over the column corresponding to `
𝑘
𝑠 , we have
𝑛(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) − 𝑛′(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ).
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Nowwe considermatrix𝐵. In the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 , we have 1 in the rowmultiplied
by[ (𝑘, 𝑡, 𝑠) and−1 in the rowmultiplied by[ (𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡). By summing over the column corresponding
to `𝑘𝑠 , we also have −
∑
𝑡≠𝑠 [ (𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡) +
∑
𝑡≠𝑠 [ (𝑘, 𝑡, 𝑠).
For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 of matrices 𝐴 and 𝐵 must sum up
to zero; so we have
𝑛(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) − 𝑛′(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) +
∑︁
𝑡≠𝑠
[−[ (𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡) + [ (𝑘, 𝑡, 𝑠)] = 0. (15)









) > (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎∗) .























where the last equality holds by the denition of 𝑛 and 𝑛′. Moreover, since 𝑑 (𝜎∗, 𝑘, 𝑠) = 𝑛(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) −
𝑛′(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) =
∑
𝑡≠𝑠 [[ (𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡) − [ (𝑘, 𝑡, 𝑠)] ≤
∑


















[ (𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡).
By the equality and the inequality above and by the fact that the last column must sum up to zero




























































































) > 𝑚(𝜎∗) log(1 + 𝑒). This is a contradiction. 
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 4














)𝑛𝑖=1 satis es conditions (i) and (ii)




For each sequence 𝜎 ∈ Σ, we dene a vector 𝑡𝜎 ∈ N𝐾
2𝑆2




), we shall identify
the pair with ((𝑘𝑖, 𝑠𝑖), (𝑘′𝑖 , 𝑠′𝑖 )). Let 𝑡𝜎 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) be the number of times that the pair (𝑥𝑘𝑠 , 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ )
appears in the sequence 𝜎 . One can then describe the satisfaction of 𝑒-PSAROEU by means of the
vectors 𝑡𝜎 . Observe that 𝑡 depends only on (𝑥𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 in the dataset (𝑥
𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
. It does not depend
on prices.
For each ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , de ne 𝛿 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) = log(𝑝𝑘𝑠 /𝑝𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ ). And de ne
𝛿 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) = 0 when 𝑥𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ . Then, 𝛿 is a 𝐾






𝛿 · 𝑡𝜎 =
∑︁
((𝑘,𝑠),(𝑘 ′,𝑠 ′))∈(𝐾𝑆)2













So the dataset satis es 𝑒-PSAROEU with respect to ` if and only if 𝛿 · 𝑡𝜎 ≤ 𝑚(𝜎) log(1 + 𝑒) for all
𝜎 ∈ Σ.
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order: 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < · · · < 𝑦𝑁 , and x an arbitrary
b ∈ (0, 1). We shall construct by induction a sequence {(Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛))}𝑁𝑛=1, where Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛) is de ned for all
(𝑘, 𝑠) with 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛 .
By the denseness of the rational numbers, and the continuity of the exponential function, for
each (𝑘, 𝑠) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦1, there exists a positive number Y𝑘𝑠 (1) such that log(𝜌𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (1)) ∈ Q and
b < Y𝑘𝑠 (1) < 1. Let Y (1) = min{Y𝑘𝑠 (1) | 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦1}.
In second place, for each (𝑘, 𝑠) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦2, there exists a positive Y𝑘𝑠 (2) such that
log(𝜌𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (2)) ∈ Q and b < Y𝑘𝑠 (2) < Y (1). Let Y (2) = min{Y𝑘𝑠 (2) | 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦2}.
In third place, and reasoning by induction, suppose that Y (𝑛) has been de ned and that b <
Y (𝑛). For each (𝑘, 𝑠) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛+1, let Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1) > 0 be such that log(𝜌𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1)) ∈ Q, and
b < Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1) < Y (𝑛). Let Y (𝑛 + 1) = min{Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1) | 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛}.
This de nes the sequence (Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛)) by induction. Note that Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1)/Y (𝑛) < 1 for all 𝑛. Let
¯b < 1 be such that Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1)/Y (𝑛) < ¯b .
For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , let 𝜌𝑘𝑠 = 𝜌𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛), where 𝑛 is such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛 . Choose `′ ∈ Δ++(𝑆)
such that for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 log `′𝑠 ∈ Q and `′𝑠 ∈ [ ¯b`𝑠, `𝑠/ ¯b] for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 . Such `′ exists by the denseness





Then, log𝑞𝑘𝑠 = log 𝜌
𝑘
𝑠 − log `′𝑠 ∈ Q.
We claim that the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satis es 𝑒′-PSAROEUwith respect to `′. Let 𝛿∗ be de ned
from (𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1




For each pair ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) with 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , if 𝑛 and 𝑚 are such that 𝑥
𝑘
𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛 and 𝑥
𝑘 ′
𝑠 ′ = 𝑦𝑚 ,































= 𝛿 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) .
Now, we choose 𝑒′ such that 𝑒′ ≥ 𝑒 and log(1 + 𝑒′) ∈ Q.
Thus, for all 𝜎 ∈ Σ, 𝛿∗ · 𝑡𝜎 ≤ 𝛿 · 𝑡𝜎 ≤ 𝑚(𝜎) log(1 + 𝑒) ≤ 𝑚(𝜎) log(1 + 𝑒′) as 𝑡· ≥ 0 and the
dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satis es 𝑒-PSAROEU with respect to `.
Thus the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satis es 𝑒′-PSAROEU with respect to `′. Finally, note that b <
Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛) < 1 for all 𝑛 and each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 . So that by choosing b close enough to 1, we can take 𝜌
to be as close to 𝜌 as desired. By the de nition, we also can take `′ to be as close to ` as desired.
Consequently, by (16), we can take (𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
to be as close to (𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
as desired. We also can take
𝑒′ to be as close to 𝑒 as desired.
A.3.3 Proof of Lemma 5
We use the following notational convention: For a matrix 𝐷 with 2(𝐾 × 𝑆) + 𝐾 + 1 columns,
write 𝐷1 for the submatrix of 𝐷 corresponding to the rst 𝐾 ×𝑆 columns; let 𝐷2 be the submatrix
corresponding to the following 𝐾 × 𝑆 columns; 𝐷3 correspond to the next 𝐾 columns; and 𝐷4 to
the last column. Thus, 𝐷 = [𝐷1 𝐷2 𝐷3 𝐷4 ].
Consider the system comprised by (12), (13), and (14) in the proof of Lemma 3. Let 𝐴, 𝐵, and
𝐸 be constructed from the dataset as in the proof of Lemma 3. The di erence with respect to
Lemma 3 is that now the entries of 𝐴4 and 𝐵4 may not be rational. Note that the entries of 𝐸, 𝐵,
and 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 are rational.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no solution to the system comprised by (12), (13),
and (14). Then, by the argument in the proof of Lemma 3 there is no solution to system 𝑆1.
Lemma 11 (in Appendix B.4) with F = R implies that there is a real vector (\, [, 𝜋) such that
\ ·𝐴 +[ ·𝐵 +𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0 and [ ≥ 0, 𝜋 > 0. Recall that 𝐸4 = 1, so we obtain that \ ·𝐴4 +[ ·𝐵4 +𝜋 = 0.
Consider (𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
, `′, and 𝑒′ be such that the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satis es 𝑒′-PSAROEU with
respect to `′, and log𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ Q for all 𝑘 and 𝑠 , log `′𝑠 ∈ Q for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , and log(1 + 𝑒′) ∈ Q. (Such
(𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
, `′, and 𝑒′ exist by Lemma 4.) Construct matrices 𝐴′, 𝐵′, and 𝐸′ from this dataset in the
same way as 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐸 is constructed in the proof of Lemma 3. Note that only the prices, the
objective probabilities, and the bounds are di erent. So 𝐸′ = 𝐸 and 𝐴′𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐵
′
𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 for




may be di erent from 𝐴4 and 𝐵4, respectively.
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) − (\ ·𝐴4+[ ·𝐵4) | < 𝜋/2. We
have shown that \ ·𝐴4+[ ·𝐵4 = −𝜋 , so the choice of 𝑞𝑘 , `′, and 𝑒′ guarantees that \ ·𝐴′4+[ ·𝐵′4 < 0.
Let 𝜋 ′ = −\ · 𝐴′
4
− [ · 𝐵′
4
> 0.
Note that \ ·𝐴′𝑖 +[ ·𝐵′𝑖 +𝜋 ′𝐸𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, as (\, [, 𝜋) solves system 𝑆2 for matrices𝐴, 𝐵 and
𝐸, and𝐴′𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵
′
𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 and 𝐸𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3. Finally, \ ·𝐴′4+[ ·𝐵′4+𝜋 ′𝐸4 = \ ·𝐴′4+[ ·𝐵′4+𝜋 ′ = 0.
We also have that [ ≥ 0 and 𝜋 ′ > 0. Therefore \ , [, and 𝜋 ′ constitute a solution to 𝑆2 for matrices
𝐴′, 𝐵′, and 𝐸′.
Lemma 11 then implies that there is no solution to system 𝑆1 for matrices 𝐴′, 𝐵′, and 𝐸′. So
there is no solution to the system comprised by (12), (13), and (14) in the proof of Lemma 3.
However, this contradicts Lemma 3 because the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘) satises 𝑒′-PSAROEU with `′,
log(1 + 𝑒′) ∈ Q, log `′𝑠 ∈ Q for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , and log𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ Q for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 .
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B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
First, we prove a lemma which establishes Theorem 3 and proves useful for the suciency part
of Theorem 4. This lemma provides “Afriat inequalities” for the problem at hand.
Lemma 6. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, and let (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 be a dataset. The following statements are equivalent.
(a) (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is 𝑒-belief-perturbed SEU rational.
(b) There are strictly positive numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , _








𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , (B.1)
and for each 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`𝑙𝑠/`𝑙𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒. (B.2)
(c) (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is 𝑒-price-perturbed SEU rational.
(d) There are strictly positive numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , ˆ_










𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ ,
and for all 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
Y𝑘𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡
Y𝑙𝑠/Y𝑙𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.
(e) (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
is 𝑒-utility-perturbed SEU rational.
(f) There are strictly positive numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , ˆ_










𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ ,
and for all 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
Ŷ𝑘𝑠 /Ŷ𝑘𝑡
Ŷ𝑙𝑠/Ŷ𝑙𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.
1
Proof. The equivalence between (a) and (b), the equivalence between (c) and (d), and the equiv-
alence between (e) and (f) follow from standard arguments: see Echenique and Saito (2015) for
details. Moreover, it is easy to see the equivalence between (d) and (f) with Y𝑘𝑠 = 1/Ŷ𝑘𝑠 for each
𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 . Hence, to prove the result, it suces to show that (b) and (d) are equivalent.
















for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 . Then, `𝑘 ∈ Δ++(𝑆). Since `𝑠𝑣𝑘𝑠 = ˆ_𝑘Y𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑘𝑠 , we have `𝑘𝑠 𝑣𝑘𝑠 = _𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑠 . Moreover, for






≤ 1 + 𝑒.











For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , since `𝑘𝑠 𝑣𝑘𝑠 = _𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑠 , we have `𝑠𝑣𝑘𝑠 = ˆ_𝑘Y𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑘𝑠 . Finally, for each 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾






≤ 1 + 𝑒.

B.2 Proof of the Necessity Direction of Theorem 4
Lemma 7. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, if a dataset is 𝑒-belief-perturbed SEU rational then the dataset satis es
𝑒-PSARSEU.




)𝑛𝑖=1 ≡ 𝜎 of pairs that satis es conditions (i) and (ii) in De nition 7
and another condition that each 𝑠 appears as 𝑠𝑖 (on the left of the pair) the same number of times
2
it appears as 𝑠′𝑖 (on the right), which we refer to as condition (iii) throughout this section. By the






















































































where the second equality holds by condition (ii). See the proof of Lemma 10 of Echenique and























In the following, we evaluate the right hand side. For each (𝑘, 𝑠), we rst cancel out the same
`𝑘𝑠 as much as possible both from the denominator and the numerator. Then, the number of `
𝑘
𝑠
remained in the numerator is 𝑑 (𝜎, 𝑘, 𝑠) as de ned in De nition 8. Since the number of terms
in the numerator and the denominator must be the same, the number of remaining fraction is





























. Since the sequence is obtained by can-
celing out 𝑥𝑘𝑠 from the rst element and the second element of the pairs the same number of




)𝑛𝑖=1 satis es conditions (ii) and (iii), it follows that






satis es conditions (ii) and (iii).
By condition (iii), we can assume without loss of generality that 𝑠 𝑗 = 𝑠
′
𝑗 for each 𝑗 . Fix 𝑠
∗ ∈ 𝑆 .















































































≤ (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎) .

B.3 Proof of the Suciency Direction in Theorem 4
The outline of the argument is the same as the proof of Theorem 2 and Echenique and Saito
(2015). As in the proof of Theorem 2, we need three lemmas to prove the su ciency direction.
We know from Lemma 6 that it su ces to nd a solution to the Afriat inequalities (actually
rst-order conditions). So we set up the problem to nd a solution to a system of linear inequal-
ities obtained from using logarithms to linearize the Afriat inequalities in Lemma 6.
The rst lemma, Lemma 8, establishes that 𝑒-PSARSEU is su cient for e-belief-perturbed SEU
rationality when the logarithms of the prices are rational numbers.
The second lemma, Lemma 9, establishes that we can approximate any dataset satisfying 𝑒-
PSARSEUwith a dataset for which the logarithms of prices are rational, and forwhich 𝑒-PSARSEU
is satis ed.
Finally, Lemma 10 establishes the result by using another version of the theorem of the alter-
native, stated as Lemma 11 above.
The statement of the lemmas follow. The rest of the section is devoted to the proof of these
lemmas.
Lemma 8. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, let a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒-PSARSEU. Suppose that log(𝑝
𝑘
𝑠 ) ∈ Q for
all 𝑘 and 𝑠 and log(1+𝑒) ∈ Q. Then there are numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , _𝑘 , `𝑘𝑠 for 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 satisfying (B.1)
and (B.2) in Lemma 6.
Lemma 9. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, let a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒-PSARSEU. Then for all positive numbers
Y, there exist a positive real number 𝑒′ ∈ [𝑒, 𝑒 + Y] and 𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ [𝑝𝑘𝑠 − Y, 𝑝𝑘𝑠 ] for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 such
that log𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ Q and the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒
′-PSARSEU.
Lemma 10. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, let a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝑘𝑘=1 satisfy 𝑒-PSARSEU. Then there are numbers 𝑣
𝑘
𝑠 ,
_𝑘 , `𝑘𝑠 for 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 satisfying (B.1) and (B.2) in Lemma 6.
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B.3.1 Proof of Lemma 8
The proof is similar to the proof of Echenique and Saito (2015), which corresponds to the case
with 𝑒 = 0. By log-linearizing system (B.1), and inequality (B.2) in Lemma 6, we have for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , such that
log `𝑘𝑠 + log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 = log _𝑘 + log𝑝𝑘𝑠 , (B.3)
𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘 ′
𝑠 ′ =⇒ log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ log 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , (B.4)
and for all 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 ,
log `𝑘𝑠 − log `𝑘𝑡 − log `𝑙𝑠 + log `𝑙𝑡 ≤ log(1 + 𝑒). (B.5)
We are going to write the system of inequalities (B.3)-(B.5) in matrix form. The formulation
follows Echenique and Saito (2015), with some modications.
Let 𝐴 be a matrix with 𝐾 × 𝑆 rows and 2(𝐾 × 𝑆) + 𝐾 + 1 columns, de ned as follows: We
have one row for every pair (𝑘, 𝑠), two columns for every pair (𝑘, 𝑠), one column for each 𝑘 , and
one last column. In the row corresponding to (𝑘, 𝑠), the matrix has zeroes everywhere with the
following exceptions: it has 1’s in columns for (𝑘, 𝑠); it has a −1 in the column for 𝑘 ; it has − log𝑝𝑘𝑠
in the very last column. Matrix 𝐴 looks as follows:













(𝑘,𝑠) · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log𝑝𝑘𝑠
(𝑘,𝑡) · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · · · · −1 0 · · · − log𝑝𝑘𝑠
(𝑙,𝑠) · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 −1 · · · − log𝑝𝑙𝑠














Next, we write the system of inequalities (B.4) and (B.5) in matrix form. There is one row in
matrix 𝐵 for each pair (𝑘, 𝑠) and (𝑘′, 𝑠′) for which 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′





we have zeroes everywhere with the exception of a −1 in the column for (𝑘, 𝑠) and a 1 in the
column for (𝑘′, 𝑠′). Matrix 𝐵 has additional rows, that capture the system of inequalities (B.5):
We do not need a constraint for each quadruple (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡), as some of them would be redundant.
Speci cally, we need the constraints
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`𝑙𝑠/`𝑙𝑡




≤ 1 + 𝑒 , which is equivalent to
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`𝑙𝑠/`𝑙𝑡











. So for each (𝑠, 𝑡) with
𝑠 < 𝑡 , and each 𝑘 ≠ 𝑙 we are going to have the constraint (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡).15 For each such (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡) we
15
The inequality 𝑠 < 𝑡 is simply a devise to ensure that we choose only one of the two ordered pairs of 𝑠 and 𝑡 .
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have two rows. One of these rows has a 1 in the column for `𝑘𝑠 and `
𝑙
𝑡 , a −1 in the column for `𝑘𝑡
and `𝑙𝑠 , and log(1 + 𝑒) in the very last column; one of these rows has a 1 in the column for `𝑘𝑡 and
`𝑙𝑠 , a −1 in the column for `𝑘𝑠 and `𝑙𝑡 , and log(1 + 𝑒) in the very last column. So this part of matrix
𝐵 is as follows:













· · · 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · −1 1 1 −1 · · · · · · 0 0 · · · log(1 + 𝑒)














Finally, we have a matrix 𝐸 which has a single row and has zeroes everywhere except for 1 in
the last column.
To sum up, there is a solution to the system (B.3)-(B.5) if and only if there is a vector 𝑢 ∈
R2(𝐾×𝑆)+𝐾+1 that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
𝑆1 :

𝐴 · 𝑢 = 0,
𝐵 · 𝑢 ≥ 0,
𝐸 · 𝑢 > 0.
The entries of 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐸 are either 0, 1 or −1, with the exception of the last column of 𝐴
and 𝐵. Under the hypotheses of the lemma we are proving, the last column consists of rational
numbers. By Motzkin’s theorem, then, there is such a solution 𝑢 to 𝑆1 if and only if there is no
rational vector (\, [, 𝜋) that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
𝑆2 :

\ · 𝐴 + [ · 𝐵 + 𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0,
[ ≥ 0,
𝜋 > 0.
In the following, we shall prove that the non-existence of a solution 𝑢 implies that the dataset
must violate 𝑒-PSARSEU. Suppose then that there is no solution 𝑢 and let (\, [, 𝜋) be a rational
vector as above, solving system 𝑆2.
The outline of the rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. Since (\, [, 𝜋) are
rational vectors, by multiplying all of their entries by a large enough integer, we can without loss
of generality assume that (\, [, 𝜋) are integer vectors.
Then we transform the matrices 𝐴 and 𝐵 using \ and [. (i) If \𝑟 > 0, then create \𝑟 copies
of the 𝑟 th row; (ii) omitting row 𝑟 when \𝑟 = 0; and (iii) if \𝑟 < 0, then \𝑟 copies of the 𝑟 th row
multiplied by −1.
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Similarly, we create a new matrix by including the same columns as 𝐵 and [𝑟 copies of each
row (and thus omitting row 𝑟 when [𝑟 = 0; recall that [𝑟 ≥ 0 for all 𝑟 ).
By using the transformed matrices and the fact that \ ·𝐴 + [ · 𝐵 + 𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0 and [ ≥ 0, we can
prove the following claims:




)𝑛∗𝑖=1 of pairs that satises conditions (i) and (ii) in De ni-
tion 7.
Proof. The proof is the same as in the proof of Lemma 11 in Echenique and Saito (2015). 




)𝑛∗𝑖=1 ≡ 𝜎∗, each 𝑠 appears as 𝑠𝑖 (on the left of the pair) the same
number of times it appears as 𝑠′𝑖 (on the right).
Proof. Recall our construction of the matrix 𝐵. We have a constraint for each quadruple (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡)
with 𝑠 < 𝑡 . Denote the weight on the rows capturing
`𝑘𝑠 /`𝑘𝑡
`𝑙𝑠/`𝑙𝑡
≤ 1+𝑒 by [ (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡). Let 𝑛(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) ≡ #{𝑖 |
𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑥
𝑘𝑖




}. For notational convenience, de ne [ (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡) = 0 for all
quadruples (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡) with 𝑡 < 𝑠 .
For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , in the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 in matrix 𝐴, remember that we
have 1 if we have 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑥
𝑘𝑖




for some 𝑖 . This is because a row
in 𝐴 must have 1 (−1) in the column corresponding to 𝑣𝑘𝑠 if and only if it has 1 (−1, respectively)
in the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 . By summing over the column corresponding to `
𝑘
𝑠 , we have
𝑛(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ) − 𝑛′(𝑥𝑘𝑠 ).
Now we consider matrix 𝐵. In the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 and 𝑠 < 𝑡 , we have −1 in the
row multiplied by [ (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡) and 1 in the row multiplied by [ (𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡). By summing over the








𝑡≠𝑠 [ (𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡).
For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , the column corresponding to `𝑘𝑠 of matrices 𝐴 and 𝐵 must sum up
to zero; so we have










[ (𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑡) = 0.
Therefore, for each 𝑠 ,∑︁
𝑘∈𝐾
(
































This means that each 𝑠 appears as 𝑠𝑖 (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears









) > (1 + 𝑒)𝑚(𝜎∗) .





















[ (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡)
)
log(1 + 𝑒) = −𝜋 < 0.





















[ (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡)
)
log(1 + 𝑒) > 0.
Remember that for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 ,















[ (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡).











































[ (𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑠, 𝑡)
)
log(1 + 𝑒) ≥ 𝑚(𝜎∗) log(1 + 𝑒).
This is a contradiction. 
B.3.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Let X = {𝑥𝑘𝑠 | 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆}. Consider the set of sequences that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in













)𝑛𝑖=1 satis es conditions (i) and (ii)




For each sequence 𝜎 ∈ Σ, we dene a vector 𝑡𝜎 ∈ N𝐾
2𝑆2




), we shall identify
the pair with ((𝑘𝑖, 𝑠𝑖), (𝑘′𝑖 , 𝑠′𝑖 )). Let 𝑡𝜎 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) be the number of times that the pair (𝑥𝑘𝑠 , 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ )
appears in the sequence 𝜎 . One can then describe the satisfaction of 𝑒-PSARSEU by means of the
vectors 𝑡𝜎 . Observe that 𝑡 depends only on (𝑥𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 in the dataset (𝑥
𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
. It does not depend
on prices.
For each ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , de ne 𝛿 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) = log(𝑝𝑘𝑠 /𝑝𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ ). And de ne
𝛿 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) = 0 when 𝑥𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ . Then, 𝛿 is a 𝐾






𝛿 · 𝑡𝜎 =
∑︁
((𝑘,𝑠),(𝑘 ′,𝑠 ′))∈(𝐾×𝑆)2













So the dataset satis es 𝑒-PSARSEU if and only if 𝛿 · 𝑡𝜎 ≤ 𝑚(𝜎) log(1 + 𝑒) for all 𝜎 ∈ Σ.
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order: 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < · · · < 𝑦𝑁 , and x an arbitrary
b ∈ (0, 1). We shall construct by induction a sequence {(Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛))}𝑁𝑛=1, where Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛) is de ned for all
(𝑘, 𝑠) with 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛 .
By the denseness of the rational numbers, and the continuity of the exponential function, for
each (𝑘, 𝑠) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦1, there exists a positive number Y𝑘𝑠 (1) such that log(𝑝𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (1)) ∈ Q and
b < Y𝑘𝑠 (1) < 1. Let Y (1) = min{Y𝑘𝑠 (1) | 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦1}.
In second place, for each (𝑘, 𝑠) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦2, there exists a positive Y𝑘𝑠 (2) such that
log(𝑝𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (2)) ∈ Q and b < Y𝑘𝑠 (2) < Y (1). Let Y (2) = min{Y𝑘𝑠 (2) | 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦2}.
In third place, and reasoning by induction, suppose that Y (𝑛) has been de ned and that b <
Y (𝑛). For each (𝑘, 𝑠) such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛+1, let Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1) > 0 be such that log(𝑝𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1)) ∈ Q, and
b < Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1) < Y (𝑛). Let Y (𝑛 + 1) = min{Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1) | 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛}.
This de nes the sequence (Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛)) by induction. Note that Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1)/Y (𝑛) < 1 for all 𝑛. Let
¯b < 1 be such that Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛 + 1)/Y (𝑛) < ¯b .
For each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , let 𝑞𝑘𝑠 = 𝑝𝑘𝑠 Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛), where 𝑛 is such that 𝑥𝑘𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛 . We claim that the
dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satis es 𝑒-PSARSEU. Let 𝛿∗ be de ned from (𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
in the same manner as 𝛿
was de ned from (𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
.
For each pair ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) with 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , if 𝑛 and 𝑚 are such that 𝑥
𝑘
𝑠 = 𝑦𝑛 and 𝑥
𝑘 ′
𝑠 ′ = 𝑦𝑚 ,































= 𝛿 ((𝑘, 𝑠), (𝑘′, 𝑠′)) .
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Now we choose 𝑒′ such that 𝑒′ ≥ 𝑒 and log(1 + 𝑒′) ∈ Q.
Thus, for all 𝜎 ∈ Σ, 𝛿∗ · 𝑡𝜎 ≤ 𝛿 · 𝑡𝜎 ≤ 𝑚(𝜎) log(1 + 𝑒) ≤ 𝑚(𝜎) log(1 + 𝑒′) as 𝑡· ≥ 0 and the
dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satises 𝑒-PSARSEU.
Therefore, the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satis es 𝑒′-PSARSEU. Finally, note that b < Y𝑘𝑠 (𝑛) < 1 for





as desired. We also can take 𝑒′ to be as close to 𝑒 as desired.
B.3.3 Proof of Lemma 10
Consider the system comprised by (B.3), (B.4), and (B.5) in the proof of Lemma 8. Let 𝐴, 𝐵, and
𝐸 be constructed from the dataset as in the proof of Lemma 8. The di erence with respect to
Lemma 8 is that now the entries of 𝐴4 and 𝐵4 may not be rational. Note that the entries of 𝐸, 𝐵𝑖 ,
and 𝐴𝑖 , for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 are rational.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no solution to the system comprised by (B.3), (B.4),
and (B.5). Then, by the argument in the proof of Lemma 8 there is no solution to system 𝑆1.
Lemma 11 (in Appendix B.4) with F = R implies that there is a real vector (\, [, 𝜋) such that
\ ·𝐴 +[ ·𝐵 +𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0 and [ ≥ 0, 𝜋 > 0. Recall that 𝐸4 = 1, so we obtain that \ ·𝐴4 +[ ·𝐵4 +𝜋 = 0.
Let (𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
vectors of prices and a positive real number 𝑒′ be such that the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
satis es 𝑒′-PSARSEU and log𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ Q for all 𝑘 and 𝑠 and log(1 + 𝑒′) ∈ Q. (Such (𝑞𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 and 𝑒
′
exist
by Lemma 9.) Construct matrices 𝐴′, 𝐵′, and 𝐸′ from this dataset in the same way as 𝐴, 𝐵, and
𝐸 is constructed in the proof of Lemma 8. Since only prices 𝑞𝑘 and the bound 𝑒′ are di erent in




may be di erent from 𝐴4 and 𝐵4, respectively. So 𝐸
′ = 𝐸, 𝐵′𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 and
𝐴′𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3.




) − (\ ·𝐴4+[ ·𝐵4) | < 𝜋/2.
We have shown that \ · 𝐴4 + [ · 𝐵4 = −𝜋 , so the choice of prices 𝑞𝑘 and 𝑒′ guarantees that
\ · 𝐴′
4
+ [ · 𝐵′
4
< 0. Let 𝜋 ′ = −\ · 𝐴′
4
− [ · 𝐵′
4
> 0.
Note that \ ·𝐴′𝑖 +[ ·𝐵′𝑖 +𝜋 ′𝐸𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, as (\, [, 𝜋) solves system 𝑆2 for matrices𝐴, 𝐵 and
𝐸, and𝐴′𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵
′
𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 and 𝐸𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3. Finally, \ ·𝐴′4+[ ·𝐵′4+𝜋 ′𝐸4 = \ ·𝐴′4+[ ·𝐵′4+𝜋 ′ = 0.
We also have that [ ≥ 0 and 𝜋 ′ > 0. Therefore \ , [, and 𝜋 ′ constitute a solution to 𝑆2 for matrices
𝐴′, 𝐵′, and 𝐸′.
Lemma 11 then implies that there is no solution to system 𝑆1 for matrices 𝐴′, 𝐵′, and 𝐸′. So
there is no solution to the system comprised by (B.3), (B.4), and (B.5) in the proof of Lemma 8.
However, this contradicts Lemma 8 because the dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘) satis es 𝑒′-PSARSEU, log(1+𝑒′) ∈
Q, and log𝑞𝑘𝑠 ∈ Q for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 .
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B.4 Theorem of the Alternative
We shall use the following lemma, which is a version of the Theorem of the Alternative. This is
Theorem 1.6.1 in Stoer and Witzgall (1970). We shall use it here in the cases where 𝐹 is either the
real or the rational number eld.
Lemma 11. Let 𝐴 be an𝑚 ×𝑛 matrix, 𝐵 be an 𝑙 ×𝑛 matrix, and 𝐸 be an 𝑟 ×𝑛 matrix. Suppose that
the entries of the matrices 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐸 belong to a commutative ordered eld F. Exactly one of the
following alternatives is true.
1. There is 𝑢 ∈ F𝑛 such that 𝐴 · 𝑢 = 0, 𝐵 · 𝑢 ≥ 0, 𝐸 · 𝑢  0.
2. There is \ ∈ F𝑟 , [ ∈ F𝑙 , and 𝜋 ∈ F𝑚 such that \ · 𝐴 + [ · 𝐵 + 𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0; 𝜋 > 0 and [ ≥ 0.
The next lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 11. See Lemma 12 in Chambers and
Echenique (2014) for a proof.
Lemma 12. Let 𝐴 be an𝑚 ×𝑛 matrix, 𝐵 be an 𝑙 ×𝑛 matrix, and 𝐸 be an 𝑟 ×𝑛 matrix. Suppose that
the entries of the matrices𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐸 are rational numbers. Exactly one of the following alternatives
is true.
1. There is 𝑢 ∈ R𝑛 such that 𝐴 · 𝑢 = 0, 𝐵 · 𝑢 ≥ 0, and 𝐸 · 𝑢  0.
2. There is \ ∈ Q𝑟 , [ ∈ Q𝑙 , and 𝜋 ∈ Q𝑚 such that \ · 𝐴 + [ · 𝐵 + 𝜋 · 𝐸 = 0; 𝜋 > 0 and [ ≥ 0.
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C Computing 𝑒∗
We demonstrate how to calculate 𝑒∗ given a dataset of choice under risk. To calculate the value,
it is easier to use price-perturbed OEU rationality, rather than belief-perturbed OEU rationality.
Formally, for a given data set (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
, we want to compute 𝑒∗ such that the data set is price per-
turbed OEU rational given the number 𝑒 . We can transform this problem into an easier problem
with the following remark.
Remark C.1. Given 𝑒 ∈ R+, a data set (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU rational if and only if
there are strictly positive numbers 𝑣𝑘𝑠 , _










𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ , (C.1)
and for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆
1
1 + 𝑒 ≤
Y𝑘𝑠
Y𝑘𝑡
≤ 1 + 𝑒.
By the remark, the 𝑒∗ can be obtained by solving the following problem:
min













𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑣𝑘𝑠 ≤ 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ .
We then substitute Y𝑘𝑠 in the objective function by using the equality constraint in (C.1). By





(log `∗𝑠 + log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 − log𝑝𝑘𝑠 ) − (log `∗𝑡 + log 𝑣𝑘𝑡 − log𝑝𝑘𝑡 )
s.t. 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘 ′




By the discussion above, we have the following result:
Remark C.2. For any data set (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
, 𝑒∗ is the solution of the problem (★), which always exists.
By using (★) and the peculiarities of the experiments, we can simplify the problem: we have





(log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 − log𝑝𝑘𝑠 ) − (log 𝑣𝑘𝑡 − log𝑝𝑘𝑡 )
s.t. 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘 ′






In order to calculate 𝑒∗ for each subject’s data, we solve problem (★) using Matlab R2017b (Math-
Works).
For each subject, the decision in every trial is characterized by a tuple (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑥1, 𝑥2) where 𝑎𝑖
represents the intercept of the budget line on each axis (here we call the 𝑥-axis “account 1” and the
𝑦-axis “account 2”), and 𝑥𝑖 represents the subject’s allocation to account 𝑖 . In order to rewrite the
choice data in a price-consumption format as in the theory, we set prices 𝑝1 = 1 (normalization)
and 𝑝2 = 𝑎1/𝑎2. This gives us a dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1.





(log `∗𝑠 + log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 − log𝑝𝑘𝑠 ) − (log `∗𝑡 + log 𝑣𝑘𝑡 − log𝑝𝑘𝑡 )
s.t. 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘 ′




Our main task is to express this problem in a matrix notation.
Let 𝒛 be a vector of length 𝐾 × 𝑆 + 𝐾 × 𝑆 + 𝑆 , whose rst 𝐾 × 𝑆 entries correspond to each of
(log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 )𝑠,𝑘 and the last 𝐾 × 𝑆 + 𝑆 entries are all 1. This vector corresponds to the control variables
of the problem. The reason why we have 𝐾 × 𝑆 additional rows of 1 in the vector will become
clear shortly.
We construct two matrices 𝐴 and 𝐵. The rst matrix 𝐴 has 𝐾 × 𝑆 rows and 𝐾 × 𝑆 + 𝐾 × 𝑆 + 𝑆
columns, and looks as follows:













(𝑘,𝑠,𝑡) · · · 1 −1 0 0 · · · · · · − log𝑝𝑘𝑠 log𝑝𝑘𝑡 0 0 · · · · · · 1 −1 · · ·
(𝑘,𝑡,𝑠) · · · −1 1 0 0 · · · · · · log𝑝𝑘𝑠 − log𝑝𝑘𝑡 0 0 · · · · · · −1 1 · · ·
(𝑙,𝑠,𝑡) · · · 0 0 1 −1 · · · · · · 0 0 − log𝑝𝑙𝑠 log𝑝𝑙𝑡 · · · · · · 1 −1 · · ·














Similarly, the second matrix 𝐵 has 𝐾 × 𝑆 + 𝐾 × 𝑆 + 𝑆 columns. There is one row for every pair
(𝑘, 𝑠) and (𝑘′, 𝑠′) with 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ . In the row corresponding to (𝑘, 𝑠) and (𝑘′, 𝑠′) we have zeroes
everywhere with the exception of a −1 in the column for 𝑣𝑘𝑠 and a 1 in the column for 𝑣𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ .
We use the function fmincon to nd a solution 𝒛∗ and the value of the problem (i.e., 𝑒∗), with
max𝐴 ·𝒛 being the objective function we are going to minimize and 𝐵 ·𝒛 ≥ 0 being the constraint.
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E Minimum Perturbation Test
Rationale behind the test. We provide a detailed exposition of how we derive our test. Let
𝐻0 and 𝐻1 denote the null hypothesis that the true dataset 𝐷true = (𝑝𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is OEU rational
and the alternative hypothesis that 𝐷true is not OEU rational. To construct our test, consider a
number E∗, which is the result of the following optimization problem given a dataset 𝐷true:
min





s.t. log `∗𝑠 + log 𝑣𝑘𝑠 − log _𝑘 − log𝑝𝑘𝑠 − log Y𝑘𝑠 = 0
𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥
𝑘 ′




Under 𝐻0, the true dataset 𝐷true = (𝑝𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 is OEU rational. A slight modication of Lemma 7
in Echenique and Saito (2015) implies that there exist strictly positive numbers ?̃?𝑘𝑠 , and _̃
𝑘
for all
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 such that
log `∗𝑠 + log ?̃?𝑘𝑠 − log _̃𝑘 − log𝑝𝑘𝑠 = 0 and 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ =⇒ log ?̃?𝑘𝑠 ≤ log ?̃?𝑘
′
𝑡𝑠 .




𝑠 for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 yields
log `∗𝑠 + log ?̃?𝑘𝑠 − log _̃𝑘 − log𝑝𝑘𝑠 = log Y𝑘𝑠 and 𝑥𝑘𝑠 > 𝑥𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ =⇒ log ?̃?𝑘𝑠 ≤ log ?̃?𝑘
′
𝑠 ′ ,

















under the null hypothesis.
We construct a test as follows:
reject 𝐻0 if
∫ ∞
E∗( (𝑝𝑘 ,𝑥𝑘 )𝐾𝑘=1)
𝑓Ê (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 < 𝛼
accept 𝐻0 otherwise
,
where𝛼 is the size of the test and 𝑓Ê is the density function of the distribution of Ê = max𝑘,𝑠,𝑡 Y
𝑘
𝑠 /Y𝑘𝑡 .










≤ Ê, the true size of the test is better than 𝛼 . Concretely, size = Pr[E∗ > 𝐶𝛼 ] ≤
Pr[Ê > 𝐶𝛼 ] = 𝛼 .
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Parameter tuning. In order to perform the test, we need to obtain the distribution of Ê and
its critical value𝐶𝛼 given a signicance level 𝛼 . We obtain the distribution of Ê by assuming that
Y follows a log-normal distribution Y ∼ Λ(a, b2). 16
The crucial step in our approach is the selection of parameters (a, b2). It is natural to choose
these parameters so that there is no price perturbation on average (i.e., E[Y] = 1). However, as we
discussed above, there is no objective guide to choosing an appropriate level of Var(Y). Therefore,
we use variation in (relative) prices observed in the data.




𝑠 for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , and the noise term Y is independent of
the random selection of budgets (𝑝𝑘𝑠 )𝑠∈𝑆,𝑘∈𝐾 . Hence,










Given the observed variation in (𝑝𝑘𝑠 )𝑠∈𝑆,𝑘∈𝐾 , Var(Y) determines how much larger (or smaller, in
ratio) the variation of perturbed prices (𝑝𝑘𝑠 )𝑠∈𝑆,𝑘∈𝐾 is relative to actual prices.
Let us consider an agent who has trouble telling the two variances apart. More generally,
the agent has trouble telling the distributions of prices apart, that is why she is confusing actual
and perceived prices, but the distribution depends only on the variance; so we focus on variance.
Consider a hypothesis test for the null hypothesis that the variance of a normal random variable
with known mean has variance 𝜎2
0
against the alternative that 𝜎2 ≥ 𝜎2
0
. Let ?̂?2𝑛 be the sample
variance.












where 𝑛 is the sample size (i.e., the number of budget sets). The sampling distribution of the test
statistic 𝑇𝑛 under the null hypothesis follows a chi-squared distribution with 𝑛 − 1 degrees of
freedom.
We consider the probability [𝐼 of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, a type I error;





Note that parameters (a, b2) correspond to the mean and the variance of the random variable in the log-scale.
In other words, log Y ∼ 𝑁 (a, b2). The moments of the log-normal distribution Y ∼ Λ(a, b2) are then calculated by
E[Y] = exp(a + b2/2) and Var(Y) = exp(2a + b2) (exp(b2) − 1).
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1−𝛼,𝑛−1 is the critical value of a chi-squared distribution with 𝑛 − 1 degree of freedom at
the signicance level 𝛼 , de ned by Pr[𝜒2 < 𝜒2
1−𝛼,𝑛−1] = 1 − [𝐼 . 17








) · 𝑇𝑛 follows a chi-
squared distribution (with 𝑛− 1 degrees of freedom). Then, the probability [II of making a type II
error is given by





























































As a consequence, given a measured variance 𝜎2
0
, calculated from observed prices, and as-
sumed values for [𝐼 and [II , we can back out the minimum “detectable” value of the variance 𝜎2
1
.
From this variance of prices, we obtain Var(Y).
17
An alternative approach, without assuming that a distribution for𝑇𝑛 , and based on a large sample approximation
to the distribution of𝑇𝑛 , yields very similar results. Calculations and empirical ndings are available from the authors
upon request.
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F Supplementary Empirical Analysis
F.1 First-Order Stochastic Dominance
In the portfolio allocation environment studied in the three studies we looked at, choosing an
allocation (𝑥1, 𝑥2) from a budget line dened by prices (𝑝1, 𝑝2) violates monotonicity with respect
to rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD-monotonicity) when either (i) 𝑝1 > 𝑝2 and 𝑥1 > 𝑥2 or (ii)
𝑝2 > 𝑝1 and 𝑥2 > 𝑥1 (i.e., the choice involves more allocation toward more-expensive security).
Table F.1 presents the average fraction (out of 25) of choices violating FOSD-monotonicity
and the number of subjects without FOSD-monotonicity violations. On average, subjects made
24-34% violations of FOSD-monotonicity. The number of subjects who made no FOSD-violating
choices is less than 10% for all datasets. As discussed in Choi et al. (2014), choices can be consistent
with GARP even with violations of FOSD-monotonicity. The average fraction of FOSD-violating
choices calculated from the subsample of GARP-compliant (CCEI = 1) subjects is close to the one
we obtain from the whole sample. The entire distributions are presented in Figure F.1.
Table F.1: FOSD violation.
All subjects CCEI = 1
CKMS CMW CS CKMS CMW CS
Number of subjects 1,182 1,116 1,421 270 207 313
Average fraction of FOSD-mon. violations 0.335 0.320 0.239 0.364 0.312 0.221





























Figure F.1: Empirical CDFs of fraction of choices that violate FOSD-monotonicity. (A) All subjects. (B)
Subjects with CCEI = 1.
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F.2 Choices on the 45-Degree Line
In the experiments, subjects made choices of allocations (𝑥1, 𝑥2) by clicking on the budget line
graphically presented on the screen. Note that points on the 45-degree line correspond to equal
allocations between the two accounts (𝑥1 = 𝑥2) and therefore involve no risk (i.e., the 45-degree
line is the “full insurance” line). If a subject’s all choices are on the 45-degree line (call such
pattern diagonal allocations), we can rationalize the data with EU and hence 𝑒∗ = 0.
It is, however, extremely dicult (or almost impossible) to choose the point “exacctly” on the
45-degree line in practice. Actual choices subjects made may be slightly o from the 45-degree
line, and it can generate large 𝑒∗ (through violations of the downward-sloping demand) while
CCEI and EU-CCEI stay close to 1 (see Figure 7, panel D). In this section, we examine how much
of the disagreement between 𝑒∗ and CCEI or EU-CCEI are driven by small deviations from the
diagonal allocations.
To this end, we rst re-de ne diagonal allocations. Instead of requiring all choices to be
exactly on he 45-degree line, we call a data almost diagonal allocations if all choices are inside
small balls (with xed radius 𝑟 ) drawn around the intersections of budget lines and the 45-degree
line. We can control the size of acceptable deviations by changing the radius 𝑟 of the ball. The
idea is shown in Figure F.2. In this example, chosen allocations (black dots) are not exactly on the




Figure F.2: Almost diagonal allocations.
18
These choices also violate FOSD-monotonicity. We would expect relatively large 𝑒∗ from this choice pattern,
but its CCEI is 1 because it satis es GARP.
18
Table F.2 shows the fraction of subjects who made almost diagonal allocations (in all 25 ques-
tions) under dierent sizes of 𝑟 . Between 6% and 12% of subjects made such choice pattern when
the radius is set to 𝑟 = 1.
Table F.2: Fraction of subjects who made almost diagonal allocations.
Radius of the ball (𝑟 )
Study 𝑁 0.05 0.20 0.50 1.00
CKMS 1182 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.083
CMW 1116 0.008 0.040 0.098 0.120
CS 1421 0.005 0.023 0.048 0.060
Figures F.3 and F.4 below show the relationship between 𝑒∗ and CCEI as well as EU-CCEI, as in
Figure 8 (Section 4.2). Bottom panels in each gure focus on subjects who made almost diagonal
allocations (the radius of the ball is set to 𝑟 = 1) in all 25 questions, and top panels present the
rest of the subjects.
Bottom panels in each gure con rm that almost diagonal allocations yield values of CCEI
and EU-CCEI that are close to 1. The same subjects have dispersed values of 𝑒∗, including the
highest value in each experiment.
It does not meant that the disagreement between 𝑒∗ and CCEI-based measures come mainly
from slight deviations from the diagonal allocations. Top panels in each gure show that there








































































Figure F.3: Correlation between 𝑒∗ and CCEI. Top panels show subjects who did not choose almost di-
agonal allocations and bottom panels show those who selected almost diagonal allocations (with 𝑟 = 1).
























































































Figure F.4: Correlation between 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI. Top panels show subjects who did not choose almost
diagonal allocations and bottom panels show those who selected almost diagonal allocations (with 𝑟 = 1).
Panels: (A) CKMS, (B) CMW, (C) CS.
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F.3 Sensitivity
As is clear from the denition, our measure 𝑒∗ is a bound that has to hold across all observations
and states (see conditions (4), (5), and (6) in the de nitions of 𝑒-perturbed OEU in Section 3). It is
possible that a couple of “bad” choices signi cantly in uence the measure. This section presents
several robustness checks for the main empirical result.
Dropping critical mistakes. In this robustness check, we recalculate 𝑒∗ using subsets of ob-
served choices that exclude outliers. More precisely, for each subject, we calculate 𝑒∗ for all
combinations of 25 −𝑚 choices and pick the smallest 𝑒∗. We do this for𝑚 = 1, 2.
By construction, dropping critical mistakes shifts the distribution of the measure (Figure F.5).
However, it does not dramatically change the correlational patterns between 𝑒∗ and CCEI (Fig-
ure F.6) nor between 𝑒∗ and demographic characteristics (Figures F.7 and F.8). In this sense, the









































































Figure F.5: Empirical CDFs of 𝑒∗ and CCEI, using all observations or subsets of observations dropping one
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Figure F.6: Correlation between 𝑒? and CCEI. (Top panels) All 25 observations. (Middle panels) Drop one



































































































































































Figure F.7: Robustness of demographic correlations in Figure 9. For each subject, 𝑒∗ is recalculated after





























































































































































Figure F.8: Robustness of demographic correlations in Figure 9. For each subject, 𝑒∗ is recalculated after
dropping two critical mistakes.
24


















𝑠 for each 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
The idea behind this alternative measure is simple. As in the case of 𝑒-price-perturbed util-
ity, we search for sets of multiplicative noises (Y𝑘𝑠 )𝑠,𝑘 which could rationalize the observed data.
Instead of looking at the uniform boundmax𝑠,𝑡,𝑘 (log Y𝑘𝑠 −log Y𝑘𝑡 ) andminimizing it, we take the av-
erage of these perturbations and minimize it. A similar idea was applied to quantify the distance
from several models of time preferences in Echenique et al. (2016).
Figure F.9 presents the relationship between 𝑒 , 𝑒∗, and CCEI. Figure F.10 shows the correlation
between 𝑒 and demographic variables. These gures do not show correlational patterns that











































































Figure F.9: Correlation between 𝑒 and 𝑒∗ (top panels) and 𝑒 and CCEI (bottom panels). Panels: (A) CKMS,



















































































































































Figure F.10: 𝑒 and demographic variables.
26
F.4 Properties of 𝑒∗
𝑒∗ from observed and simulated choices. The statistical approach described in Section 4.3
is one way to assess “how big” the observed 𝑒∗’s are. Another way is to simulate choice data
assuming some behavioral model and calculate 𝑒∗ on the simulated dataset. Following Bronars
(1987), we randomly select an allocation from each budget line. Since subjects in CKMS and
CS faced a randomly selected set of budgets, we rst randomly select one set of budgets (from
the observed sets of budgets) and then randomly choose allocations on these budgets. We then
calculate 𝑒∗, as well as CCEI, using the simulated choices. We repeat this 10,000 times for each of
the three datasets.
Figure F.11 compares the observed and simulated 𝑒∗. The distribution of observed 𝑒∗ lo-
cates left of simulated 𝑒∗ (all di erences are statistically signi cant, according to two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). The actual subjects’ behavior is thus closer to OEU rationality com-
pared to completely random behavior (even though complete random is unrestrictive and may
not be the best benchmark).
Figure F.12 looks at the correlation between 𝑒∗ and CCEI and compares the pattern in observed
















































































Figure F.11: Comparison between observed and simulated 𝑒∗ (top panels) and CCEI (bottom panels). Pan-



































































Figure F.12: Comparison between observed (top panels) and simulated (bottom panels) 𝑒∗ and CCEI. Pan-
els: (A) CKMS, (B) CMW, (C) CS. Notes: Top panels are identical to those in Figure 8.
28
Bound of 𝑒∗. The value of 𝑒∗ depends on the structure of the budgets an agent faces. In par-
ticular, it is clear from 𝑒-PSAROEU that 1 + 𝑒∗ is bounded by the maximum ratio of risk-neutral
prices:





Since CKMS, CMW, and CS experiments all used two equally-likely states, the ratio of risk-neutral
prices is equal to the ratio of prices. Figure F.13 shows the observed 𝑒∗ and (participant-specic)
upper bound. (Since all subjects faced the same set of budgets in the CMW study, there is only one
vertical line.) About 13% of the subjects (475/3719 in merged data; 221/1182 in CKMS; 114/1116







































Figure F.13: Bound of 𝑒∗. The 𝑥-axis in each plot is the upper bound of 𝑒∗, given by max𝑘,𝑠,𝑡 𝑝
𝑘
𝑠 /𝑝𝑘𝑡 − 1.
Notes: There is no variation in bounds in the CMW data (panel B) since all subjects faced the same set of
budgets. In the CS data (panel C), the 𝑥-axis is cut at 10 for better visualization. There are 22 additional
observations in the data with the bounds ranging from 11 to 48.
29
F.5 Illustration of 𝑒-Perturbed OEU
In Figure 7, we present typical choice patterns from selected subjects with CCEI = 1 and varying
degrees of 𝑒∗. Panels A-F plot observed choices and panels a-f plot the relationship between
log(𝑥2/𝑥1) and log(𝑝2/𝑝1), which shows how much the dataset conforms to the downward-
sloping demand. The measure 𝑒∗, roughly speaking, captures the degree of deviation from the
downward-sloping demand.
Consider an observed dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1
and a perturbed dataset (𝑥𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘)𝐾
𝑘=1





and Y𝑘𝑠 ≥ 0 for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 . Since we x the chosen bundle (𝑥𝑘)𝐾𝑘=1 and rotate the budget
lines around them, price perturbation “moves” points in panels a-f horizontally.
Tomake the dataset 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU rational (De nition 4), we need tomove the points
horizontally so that they satisfy the downward-sloping demand. Note that the horizontal distance


































We thus need to look at the maximal horizontal adjustment among observations, and the measure
𝑒∗ is obtained by minimizing it.
Figure F.14 shows the idea behind calculation of 𝑒∗ using price perturbation. It plots the same
six subjects as in Figure 7. In panels A-F, red dotted lines represent the original budgets and blue
solid lines represent perturbed budgets. In panels a-f, green circles represent the original dataset
and blue triangles represent the perturbed dataset. Red arrows connect points that correspond
to the maximal adjustment. The gure shows that 𝑒∗-perturbed datasets satisfy the downward-
sloping demand.
19
We can draw several observations about the practical aspect of 𝑒∗. First, observe that the
“cheapest” way for correcting choices violating FOSD-monotonicity is to perturb budgets corre-




. Second, the gure provides an intuitive explana-
tion of why 𝑒∗ can be large for choice patterns like panel D. Since clicking on the point exactly
on the 45-degree line is a challenging task, choices would scatter around the 45-degree line, oc-
casionally falling in the region of FOSD-monotonicity. No matter how small these deviations
from the 45-degree line are, 𝑒-price perturbation requires horizontal adjustments to achieve the
downward-sloping demand. If the necessary adjustment is applied on a relatively extreme budget
line, 𝑒∗ for such a subject can be very high.
19
Perturbed dataset in each panel is based on one particular set of (Y𝑘𝑠 )𝑠∈𝑆,𝑘∈𝐾 returned by Matlab. There are
small deviations from the downward-sloping demand (e.g., in panels C and E), but it is possible to correct for these
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Figure F.14: Illustration of 𝑒-price-perturbed OEU rationalization. (A-F) Perturbed budgets (blue solid
lines) and the original budgets (red dotted lines). (a-f) The relation between log(𝑥2/𝑥1) and log(𝑝2/𝑝1)




We calculate CCEI at which a subject is consistent with a given model, stochastically monotone
utility maximization (Nishimura et al., 2017), EU, and concave EU, using the GRID method devel-
oped in Polisson et al. (2020).
20
We call these measures F-GARP, EU-CCEI, and cEU-CCEI. For a
given dataset, the measures are ordered as
cEU-CCEI ≤ EU-CCEI ≤ F-GARP ≤ CCEI,
since models we look at are nested in this order. Note that Polisson et al. (2020) calculated and
reported CCEI, F-GARP, EU-CCEI, and cEU-CCEI for the CKMS dataset but not for the CMW and
the CS datasets.
Figures F.15-F.17 compare 𝑒∗, CCEI, and these three additional measures.21 Panels on the
diagonal show the distribution of each measure. Pairwise scatter plots are presented below diag-
onal, and their Spearman’s correlation coecients are shown above the diagonal (all 𝑝 < 0.001;
uncorrected for multiple comparison).
The rst column in each gure shows the relationship between 𝑒∗ and other measures. The
second and the fourth panels in this column (𝑒∗ vs. CCEI and 𝑒∗ vs. EU-CCEI) are identical to
those presented in Figure 8. As we discussed in Section 4.2 of the paper, we see that there are a
signi cant number of subjects whose CCEI and EU-CCEI are close to one but their 𝑒∗’s are widely
dispersed and further away from zero.
This observation is not speci c to CCEI and EU-CCEI. In the third and the fth panels of the
same column, we can see a similar pattern between 𝑒∗ and F-GARP as well as 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI.
The pattern is a general feature that distinguishes the idea behind the measures: 𝑒∗ is based on
rotating budget lines while the other measures, which are all variants of CCEI, are based on
shrinking budget sets.
20
A stohastically monotone utility function gives strictly higher utility to bundle 𝑥 compared to another bundle𝑦 if
𝑥 rst-order stochastically dominates𝑦 and gives them the same utility if two bundles are stochastically equivalent. In
the environmentwe consider (two states with equally likely objective probabilities), a utility function is stochastically
monotone if and only if it is symmetric and strictly increasing.
Choi et al. (2014) also discuss a similar idea. They propose additional measure, which jointly captures the extent
of GARP violations and violations of stochastic dominance, by combining the observed data and its “mirror-image”.
More precisely, they assume that if an allocation (𝑥1, 𝑥2) is chosen under the budget constraint 𝑝1𝑥1 + 𝑝2𝑥2 = 1, then
(𝑥2, 𝑥1) would have been chosen under the mirror-image budget constraint 𝑝2𝑥1 + 𝑝1𝑥2 = 1. They then re-calculate
CCEI for the “combined” data consisting of 50 (25 budgets × 2) choices.
21
We did not compute cEU-CCEI for 23 subjects (8 in CMW, and 15 in CS) since the code spent signi cantly long
computation time. (Polisson et al. (2020) used a high-performance computing facility.) We also treated cEU-CCEI
for six subjects in CS as missing values, since the code incorrectly returned cEU-CCEI = 0. Note that F-GARP and












































































































































































































































































































































Figure F.17: Comparing measures of rationality in the CS data.
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F.7 Choice Pattern: Additional Examples
Choice data from four subjects presented in Section 4.2, Figure 7, are not meant to be representa-
tive of the entire dataset consisting of more than 3,000 subjects. In this section, we present more
examples to understand the similarity and dierences between 𝑒∗, CCEI, and EU-CCEI.
We pick subjects from the CMW experiment, where all the subjects faced with the same set
of 25 budget lines. This feature of the design makes the variation of 𝑒∗ smaller than in the other
datasets (we observe several “jumps” in the empirical CDF of 𝑒∗ in Figure 4), but the comparison
across choice patterns becomes easier.
Figure F.18 is the scatterplot of 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI in the CMW data. Dashed lines represent the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI. Two shaded areas represent combinations
of 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI that “disagree”, in the sense that one measure says the subject is close to EU
(relative to the median subject) but the other measure says the same subject far from EU (again,

































Figure F.18: 𝑒∗ and EU-CCEI in CMW data. Notes: Vertical dashed lines represent the 25th, 50th, and 75th
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